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STRUCTURING THE FINANCIAL SERVICE CONGWMERATES OF THE
FUTURE: DoES THE CHOICE OF CORPORATE FORM TO HOUSE NEW
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL BANKS MATTER?

. CONSTANCE Z. WAGNER 1

ABSTRACT
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act became law on November 12, 1999,
bringing to an end a twenty year effort to expand bank powers by amending
the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
Although styled as banking reform legislation, the new law will have a wide
ranging impact on the financial services industry generally. A wave of
merger activity will likely occur in this industry because many of the legal
restrictions on bank affiliations with other financial services providers have
been removed. An end result of the new legislation will be the creation of
financial services conglomerates offering a combination of banking,
securities, and insurance products under one roof.
The appropriate corporate structure for expanded banking activities
was a key issue in the debates over the new legislation, specifically whether
banks should be allowed to conduct new financial activities exclusively
through a bank holding company affiliate or whether use of a bank operating
subsidiary should also be permitted. Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the
primary vehicle for new activities will be the bank holding company affiliate.
Bank operating subsidiaries may also be used by national banks for a more
limited range of new activities and subject to certain restrictions and
conditions not applicable in the case of the holding company affiliate. The
new law reflects a compromise position in the corporate structure debate.
Given the polemical nature of the debate, such a compromise was probably
essential to ensure passage of the legislation. Nevertheless. the compromise
is not justified in drawing a distinction between the bank holding company
affiliate and the bank operating subsidiary as vehicles for new activities.
The author reaches this conclusion after analyzing the history of the
1 Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I would like
to thank Cynthia Lichtenstein, Patricia A. McCoy, Michael P. Malloy, and Douglas
R. Williams for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this
article. I gratefully acknowledge the fmandal support of the Saint Louis University
School of Law and the research assistance of Kristi Heim and Ron Kwentus, SLU
Law Class of 1999, and Ryan K. Manger, SLU Law Class of 200 1.
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corporate structure debate and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise from a
public policy perspective. She suggests further that Gramm-Leach-Bliley
represents a missed opportunity to clarify what is at stake and has resulted
instead in a further obfuscation of the issues.

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE NEW WORLD OF DEREGULATED
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES FOR NATIONAL BANKS AND
THEm AFFILIATES

Banking in the U.S. is a heavily regulated industry due to the
important role that banks play in economic life. 2 National banks, the focus
of this article, have been restricted historically in the conduct of their
operations in many and various ways, including controlled entry, restrictions
on structure, expansion, geographic location and pennissible activities,
limitations on portfolio composition, minimum capitalization requirements,
customer disclosure requirements, and continuous government reporting and
supervision of operations. 3 Critics of the bank regulatory system have
charged that sweeping changes in the marketplace, including technological
developments and the phenomenon of globalization, have rendered such
regulation at least partially obsolete and in need of overhaul.4 From the
2
Banks perfonn the essential functions of issuing transaction accounts, serving as
a back up source of liquidity to all other institutions, and serving as the transmission
belt for monetary policy. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED. REs.
BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REp. 1982, at 7. The role of banks has also been
described as processing payments and settlements, intennediating between savers
and borrowers, and helping to spread risk from markets and institutions who wish to
avoid risk to those who are willing and able to assume it. See ROBERT E. LITAN &
JOTHANANRAUCH, AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 11-13 (1997).
3
For a description of these limitations, see KENNETH SPONG, BANKING
REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS 51-220 (4th ed.
1994); see also MICHAELP. MALLOY, BANK REGULATION 34-195 (1999).
4
For recent government studies of the need for financial regulation refonn, see
Report of The President's Commission on Financial Structure & Regulation, 93rd
Congo I (1973); Blueprint For Reform: The Report ofthe Task Group on Regulation
ofFinancial Services, 98th Congo 1 (1984); Bush Task Group Report on Regulation
ofFinancial Services: Blueprintfor Reform, Hearings Before a House Subcommittee
ofthe Committee on Government Operations, 99th Congo I, pt. I and 2 (1985); The
Banking Industry in Turmoil: A Report on the Condition of The Us. Banking
Industry and the Bank Insurance Fund, Presented to the Financial Institution
Subcommittee of The House Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101 st
Congo 2 (1990); Modernizing the Financial System, Us. Treasury Department
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perspective of the banks themselves, the most problematic areas of
.. regulation in recent years have been geographic and activities restrictions
• contained in federal statutes. 5 Briefly stated, these restrictions confined bank
operations to a single state, with very limited exceptions, and constrained
bank services to a narrow spectrum of activities traditionally engaged in by
• banks or deemed to be incidental to such activities.
While geographic and activities constraints have been defended on a
variety of policy grounds, 6 these restrictions have long been unpopular with
many bankers, bank regulators, and economists. Such restrictions have been
identified as a precipitating cause of the declining competitiveness of the
American commercial banking industry, as compared to other financial
institutions in the U.S. and to banks in other countries. Banks have
experienced stiff competition in their core businesses of deposit-taking and
lending in recent years from non-depository financial institutions, including
mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, finance companies, and
government entities. These changes are the result of advances in computer
technology that have facilitated information processing and led to the
development of new financial instruments by non-bank financial institutions
that compete directly with traditional bank products. Because of legal
restrictions, banks have been unable to respond by expanding into new lines
of business and new geographic locations.? Such restrictions have a negative
Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks, FED. BANKING L. REPORTS,
No. 1377 (1991); LlTAN & RAUCH, supra note 2.
5
See Financial Services Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 10 and H.R. 668 Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Congo (1997)
(testimony of William T. McConnell on behalf of the American Bankers Ass'n).
6 Restrictions on geographic expansion have been justified on the grounds that
the size of banking organizations should be limited to prevent the undue
concentration of economic power. Such restrictions also reflect a preference for
locally controlled banks that will develop local economies. See SPONG, supra note
3, at 137-38. The policy rationales for activities restrictions are discussed infra in
Section II.A.
7
The resulting erosion in banks' core businesses is evidenced by various
... indicators. For example, the total assets held by U.S. banks increased in absolute
terms but declined relative to the share held by all domestic financial service firms
between 1980 and 1990. Total deposits declined in the same period. See JAMES R.
BARTH, ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN BANKING 73-75 (1992). The percentage
of U.S. financial assets held by domestic commercial banks declined precipitously
over the period 1950-1989, with significant gains shown by pension funds and
mutual funds. See id. at 82-83; see also George G. Kaufman, Is Banking a
Declining Industry? A Historical Perspective, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, May/Jun.
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impact on bank profits and deprive consumers of the lower priced and better
quality services that would be available if more competition were allowed. s
Removing such restrictions would also allow banks to take advantage of
increased economies of scope and scale, which could be passed along to
consumers in the form of lower prices for services, and to reduce the
riskiness of their portfolios through diversification.9
Banks have lobbied in recent years to alter or remove both
geographic and activities restrictions. In the case of geographic constraints,
Congress has dismantled to a substantial degree the federal laws preventing
nationwide expansion by banks. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (the "Riegle-Neal Act")l0 amended
provisions of the McFadden Act ll preventing interstate branching and
eliminated the Douglas Amendment I2 to the Bank Holding Company Act
preventing interstate banking through a holding company structure. As a
result of this new regulatory regime, interstate bank mergers are becoming
commonplace. It is likely that the trend towards nationwide banking will
continue in the future. 13

1994, at 2-21. Prior to recent mergers between several large U.S. banks, another
often-cited statistic was the decline in the number of U.S. banks ranked in the top
tier of banks internationally. See The Euromoney Five Hundred, EUROMONEY, Jun.
1991, at 70.
S See ROBERT E. L1TAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 61-63 (1987) (discussing
benefits of enhanced competition if legal restrictions on financial product line
expansion were dropped). See also Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, The

Political Economy of Deregulation: Evidence from the Relaxation of Bank
Branching Restrictions in the United States, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Research Paper, 1, 15-17, 23, 25 Jun. (1997); Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan,
The Benefits of Branching Deregulation, FED. REs. BD. N.Y. ECONOMIC POL'y
REV., Dec. 1997, at l3 (discussing benefits of enhanced competition if geographic
restraints were dropped).
9
See L1TAN, supra note 8, at 74-89 (discussing such benefits flowing from
removing financial product line restrictions).
10 See Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
11 See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1999).
12 The Douglas Amendment was codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1999) (repealed
1994).
13 Interstate bank mergers announced since passage of the Riegle-Neal Act include
the Nationsbank-Bank of America merger and the First Chicago-Bane One merger.
See Mergers and Acquisitions: Bank America, Nationsbank Plan Merger; Banc
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In the case of activities restrictions, Congress enacted financial
modernization legislation at the end of 1999 that substantially liberalized the
area. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("Gramm-Leach-Bliley"),14 which
became law on November 12, 1999, grants banks the authority to engage in a
wide variety of financial activities, including securities and insurance
, underwriting, that were previously prohibited or available only to a limited
extent through the regulatory approval process. Although styled as banking
reform legislation, the new law will have a wide-ranging impact on the
financial services industry generally. A wave of merger activity will likely
occur in this industry as a result of the legislation because many of the legal
restrictions on bank affiliations with other financial service providers have
been removed. An end result of the new legislation will be the creation of
financial service conglomerates offering a combination of banking,
securities, and insurance products under one roof.ls
Although bills proposing similar reforms had been introduced on a
number of occasions over a twenty year period prior to enactment of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Congress failed to enact reforms earlier for a variety
of reasons, including lobby pressure from other financial service providers
fearful of increased competition from banks with expanded powers and
disagreements among members of Congress and regulators on fundamental
issues of bank regulation. 16 In the face of Congressional inaction, banks

~

One, First Chicago Also Unveil Pact, 70 BANKING REpORTER (BNA) 631, Apr. 14,
1998.
14 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 1061h Cong., }'I Sess. The provisions
dealing with the establishment and regulation of a new type of holding company to
engage in the expanded activities become effective on March 12,2000. See id at §
161. Separate effective dates are specified for other provisions.
15 Senate Banking Committee, Press Release, Oct. 22, 1999, available at
<http://www.senate.gov!-banking!preI99!1022fsm.htm> (visited Oct. 24, 1999)
[hereinafter Senate Press Release].
16 Some of the legislation that was introduced includes: Financial Institutions
Deregulation Act, 8. 1609, 98 th Congo (1983); H.R. 3537, 98 th Congo (1983);
... Financial Services Competitive Equity Act, S.2851, 98th Congo (1984); Deposit
Insurance Reform and Competitive Enhancement Act, S. 2592, 99th Congo (1986);
• Financial Services Competitive Enhancement Act, S. 2592, 99f Congo (1986);
• Financial Modernization Act of 1987, 8.1886, 100th Congo (1987); Financial
Services Competition Act of 1997, H.R. 428, 105 th Congo (1997); Financial Services
Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105 th Congo (1998); Financial Services Act of 1999, H.R. 10,
106th Congo (1999); and Financial Services Modernization Act, S. 900, 106th Congo
(1999).
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seeking expanded powers turned to their federal banking regulators and
received permission to engage in a wide variety of securities, insurance and
other financial activities, either directly or through affiliates. 17 This was
achieved through the regulatory approval process applicable to the
commencement of a new activity by a bank or any subsidiary or affiliate. In
the years immediately prior to the passage of Gramm-Leach-B1i1ey, the
federal banking regulators acted to further accelerate and deepen the process
of deregulation of activities restrictions. These actions included (I)
liberalization of Federal Reserve Board ("Board") rules governing operation
of Section 20 securities underwriting affiliates of banks and expansion of the
right to engage in other nonbanking activities by bank holding company
affiliates, and (2) revision of Comptroller of the Currency's ("Comptroller"
or "OCC") rules governing corporate activities of national banks to allow
operating subsidiaries of such banks to engage in new activities that are not
currently permissible for national banks themselves, including revenue bond
underwriting.
Deregulating activities restrictions in this way has been criticized on
a number of grounds. First, the process is cumbersome, consuming both vast
amounts oftime and money, and the resulting approval can be relied on only
by the applicant and not by others engaging in the same activity. Second, in
the opinion of some commentators, decisions about fundamental changes in
bank policy should be made by Congress, not by banking regulators. One of
the forces driving reform legislation proposals was concern about the policy
implications of so-called piecemeal deregulation of activities restrictions
without Congressional input. 18
The gradual erosion of activities restrictions through the regulatory
approval process, combined with increasing pressure for legislative reform,
made it inevitable that activities restrictions would give way. While the
battle over expanded financial activities has been largely fought and won by
the banks, commercial activities still remain off limits for banks in the new
legislation, and it is unlikely that the wall between banking and commerce
will be dismantled at any time in the near future. 19
See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANK REGULATION, at 166-176, 186-190 (1999).
18 See Financial Modernization: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Senate Banking
Comm., lOSIh Congo (1998) (opening statement of Chairman Alfonse D'Amato).
19 See Financial Services Modernization: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 1061h Congo (1999) (testimony of
Donna Tanoue, Chairman of the FDIC). See also Financial Services Modernization:
Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the House Comm. On Banking and Financial Services,

..

17
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By the time Gramm-Leach-Bliley came before Congress, the focus
of the debate had shifted from whether deregulation of activities restrictions
should occur at all to the precise set of conditions under which it should take
place. One of the most controversial issues in the Congressional debates
over Gramm-Leach-Bliley was the appropriate site for conducting new
financial activities within the corporate structure of a bank. In the United
States, most commentators on the corporate structure issue take the position
that such activities should not be conducted within banks themselves, but
rather in separately-incorporated entities. 2o Prior to the passage of Gramm
Leach-Bliley, the two structures available under U.S. banking law and
regulatory practice were the bank holding company affiliate and the bank
operating subsidiary. While the holding company affiliate had been used for
some time for nonbanking financial activities, including underwriting and
dealing in securities a bank could not underwrite and deal in directly ("bank
ineligible securities"), the use of the bank operating subsidiary for such
activities was a new phenomenon, made possible by recent amendments to
oce regulations affecting the corporate activities of national banks.
Two viewpoints emerged in the corporate structure debate. One
view was that new activities must be conducted exclusively through a
holding company affiliate in order to insulate the bank from risks associated
with such activities and to prevent such activities from being subsidized by
federal government programs aimed at protecting depositors of commercial
banks. The Board and some securities and insurance industry lobbyists took

..
..

106th Congo (1999) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System) [hereafter Greenspan 1999 testimony].
20 The universal banking model adopted in some countries, including Germany, in
which banking and non banking financial activities carrying a high degree of risk are
combined in one entity, has not been considered as viable in the U.S. The reasons
for this include 1) fear that banks in diversified organizations would be exposed to
greater risk of failure, putting bank deposits at risk, 2) the desire to prevent banks
from using federally insured deposits to fund non banking activities, to the
competitive disadvantage of financial service providers operating without a federal
government subsidy, and 3) the belief that separate corporations would facilitate
regulation and supervision of activities. See LITAN, supra note 8, at 145. Banking
modernization proposals of the past two decades have invariably suggested
permitting expanded financial activities only through separate nonbank subsidiaries
of a parent holding company. For example, the Treasury Department under the
Reagan administration proposed financial modernization legislation that adopted this
model. See Financial Institutions Deregulation Act, S. REP. NO. 98-1609, CONGo
REc. 18647 (1983).
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this position. The other view was that banks should also be allowed to locate
the new activities in an operating subsidiary. The Department of the
Treasury ("Treasury Department" or "Treasury"), the OCC, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), as well as many bankers and
economists, supported this view.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley adopted a
compromise position on the issue. The primary vehicle for new financial
activities will be the bank holding company affiliate. However, bank
operating subsidiaries also may be used by national banks for a more limited
range of new activities and subject to certain restrictions and conditions not
applicable in the case of the holding company affiliate.
While the new legislation resolved the corporate structure debate,
there are still many unanswered questions regarding the policy basis for and
the implications of the compromise. For instance, exactly what is at stake in
the debate has never been fuJly elaborated. Most discussions of the issue
have taken place in two fora: 1) research and policy position papers issued
by the federal bank regulatory agencies, and 2) Congressional testimony and
other public statements by high-ranking officials of such agencies. In
addition, a few studies were published very recently by economists and legal
academics. 21 These discussions have focused primarily on the public policy
rationales for banking regulation, which will be discussed in Section II of
this article. Another theme runs through the debate, however, namely the
question of which federal banking agency would emerge as the winner in
what some viewed as a regulatory turf war. It was suggested that this debate
related to whether the Board or the OCC would have greater regulatory
authority over new financial activities, with the regulators being accused of
seeking an expansion of authority for its own sake and not for any reason
related to protecting the public interest. 22 If exclusive use of a bank holding
company affiliate was required by Congress, the Board would continue to
exercise significant regulatory power because it regulates bank holding
companies. On the other hand, if banks were permitted to use a bank
21 See Bernard Shull & Lawrence J. White, The Right Corporate Structure for
Expanded Bank Activities, 115 BANKING LJ. 5 (1998); Joi1o dos Santos, Securities
Activities in Banking Conglomerates: Should Their Location Be Regulated? (Federal
Reserve Bank ofCleveland Working Paper 9704, 1997); Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E.
Mattei, Organizational Freedom for Banks: The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L.
REv. 1895 (1997); Patricia A. McCoy, Financial Modernization and Banking
Structure, in BANKING LAW MANUAL at § 8.02 (2000).
22 See Carter H. Golembe, Banking Agency Turf War: It's Not Like Wendy's and
McDonald's, 17 No. 10 BANKING POL'y REp. 1 (1998); Longstreth & Mattei, supra
note 21, at 1920-21.
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operating subsidiary, it is possible that the operating subsidiary would
become the preferred vehicle, with the OCC as the regulator of national
banks and their operating subsidiaries gaining increased regulatory authority
at the expense of the Board.23 According to Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan, the issue "appears to be very small" but it will determine "the
financial regulatory structure of the United States for the next generation."24
Chairman Greenspan has expressed worry publicly, as has former Secretary
of the Treasury Robert E. Rubin, about how the resolution of this issue will
affect each regulator's ability to influence the future of banking and
economic policy in this country.25
Although the regulatory turf war angle may have some explanatory
force, the author has chosen not to focus on it in this article, preferring to
assume the statements of the participants in the debate were made in good
faith and to take at face value the terms of the debate as it has been framed in
public fora. This article will examine the corporate structure issue through
the lens of the traditional public policy concerns justifying banking
regulation.

Chairman Greenspan pointed out in his Congressional testimony on April 28,
1999 that "[t]hose activities, when performed in bank subsidiaries and financed with
bank equity capital would increase the potential profit to the overall banking
organization. It would also inevitably induce the gravitation to subsidiaries of
banks, not only of the new powers authorized by H.R. 10, but all of those powers
currently financed in holding company affiliates at higher costs of capital than those
available to the bank." Greenspan 1999 testimony, supra note 19.
24 David Wessel & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Fed Chief is Worried by Developing
Nation Debt, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1998, at A2.
25 Chairman
Greenspan noted that Congress "purposefully appointed
responsibility for this nation's financial institutions among the elected executive
branch and independent regulatory agencies," and changing this system "would be
contrary to the deliberate steps that Congress has taken to ensure a proper balance in
the regulation of this nation's dual banking system." Greenspan 1999 testimony,
supra note 19. Former Treasury Secretary Rubin noted in Congressional testimony
on May 6, 1999 that "one of an elected Administration's critical responsibilities is
the formation of economic policy, and an important component of that policy is
banking policy. In order for the elected Administration to have an effective role in
banking policy it must have a strong connection with the banking system, that
connection would be weakened if new financial activities were off limits to acc
supervision." Financial Services Act of 1999: Hearings on HR. 10 Before The
Comm. on Commerce, Finance and Hazardous Materials, 106th Congo (1999)
(testimony of Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury).
23
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To rephrase the terms of the debate in a slightly different way, the
issue is whether there is a compelling governmental interest in limiting new
financial activities for national banks to a particular corporate structure, as
opposed to permitting banks to choose their own corporate structure. The
resolution of this debate in Gramm-Leach-Bliley will have an impact not
only on the financial services industry, but on other constituencies as well,
including bank customers and taxpayers.26 It is therefore appropriate to
analyze the debate in terms of the public policy rationales that underlie
banking regulation in order to determine whether one choice is preferable to
the other. The author will attempt to answer three questions. First, is there
any public policy reason to eliminate use of either the operating subsidiary or
holding company affiliate as a vehicle for new financial activities? Second,
is there any public policy reason to prefer one structure over another? Third,
if there is no compelling governmental interest in eliminating one structure
or preferring one over the other, should banks be free to choose the corporate
structure they use for their operations?
This article will be structured as follows. In order to provide an
analytical framework for discussion of the corporate structure debate, Part II
will review the public policy rationales traditionally advanced to support
activities restrictions applicable to national banks and their affiliates, as welI
as some additional policy rationales advanced in connection with the debate.
Part II will also examine the origin of the debate, which is traceable to
regulatory changes immediately preceding the passage of Gramm-Leach
Bliley that expanded the authority of national banks to conduct new financial
activities through both operating subsidiaries and holding company affiliates.
Part III will review the corporate structure debate in the context of passage
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, including the compromise position reached in this
legislation. The major viewpoints in the corporate structure debate will be
considered. Part IV will evaluate the debate over choice of corporate
structure for new financial activities from the perspective of the public policy
rationales for bank regulation. Part V sets forth the author's conclusions.
The author concludes that dictating the structure that banks must use
for conducting new financial activities is unwarranted from the perspective

26 For example, if banks are permitted to choose their corporate structure based on
cost considerations, customers will benefit from lower-priced products. If greatly
increased risks to banks will be the result of product line deregulation, taxpayers
may pay the price of resolving bank insolvencies if federal deposit insurance funds
are insufficient, as they did in the case of the savings and loan insolvency crisis of
the 1980's.

2000]

STRUCTURING THE FINANCIAL SERVICE CONGLOMERATES

339

of preserving bank safety and soundness, and avoiding conflicts of interest,
the policy rationales traditionally advanced for restricting the activities of
banks. This conclusion is based on an analysis of both the theoretical risks
that may be associated with conducting new financial activities, as well as
the limited available empirical evidence regarding conduct of new financial
activities by banks and their affiliates. In fact, mandating use of a holding
company affiliate might actually undermine bank safety and soundness
because it is arguable that banks would be deprived of certain benefits, such
as increased efficiency, cost-savings, and increased income, associated with
use of an operating subsidiary. Such analysis also does not suggest that one
form is to be preferred over another. The current debate has failed to
adequately take account of corporate separateness and the use of firewaHs as
factors that can insulate banks from the additional risks associated with new
financial activities.
The author also considers the debate from the perspective of a policy
rationale not traditionally raised to justify activities restrictions but that has
been often discussed in the corporate structure debate, namely preventing the
spread of the federal government subsidy intended to support commercial
banking activities and protect depositors, which consists of deposit insurance
from the FDIC, access to the discount window at the Board, and access to
the payment system at the Board (the "federal safety net subsidy") into new
areas that the U.S. Congress never intended should be covered by such
subsidy. This policy rationale has been advanced to support exclusive use of
the holding company affiliate structure. The author concludes that the
theoretical arguments and available empirical evidence regarding the
existence of such a subsidy and whether the holding company affiliate is
better at containing the spread of such subsidy to new activities are
inconclusive at best. Therefore, such policy rationale does not support
mandated or even preferential use of the holding company affiliate structure.
Finally, the author considers the policy argument that use of a
holding company affiliate should be required in order to preserve the bank
regulatory functions of the Board, which regulates both bank holding
companies and their nonbank affiliates, but not national bank operating
subsidiaries. Although this argument was touched on in Congressional
hearings on financial modernization legislation and in other public
statements of members of the Board, it has not been at the center of the
corporate structure debate and has not been mentioned by most
commentators on the topic. Because it has not been the subject of public
debate, the argument is difficult to evaluate even-handedly. It appears,
however, to relate to the ability of the Board to effectively function as a
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lender of last resort and to deal effectively with problems of systemic risk.
This is a public policy issue of crucial significance and cannot be ignored.
However, since neither the parameters of the problem nor possible solutions
in this context have been publicly debated, it is not an appropriate policy
basis for preferring use of the holding company affiliate.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise, which draws a distinction
between use of the bank holding company affiliate and the bank operating
subsidiary as vehicles for new financial activities, is not justified on public
policy grounds. While the compromise offers something to both sides in the
debate, it does not put to rest the policy concerns of either side. As such,
Gramm-Leach-Bliley represents a missed opportunity to clarify what is at
stake and has resulted instead in a further obfuscation of the issues.

II.

ORIGINS OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE DEBATE:
APPROVAL BY FEDERAL BANKING REGULATORS OF
NEW FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES BY BANK AFFILIATES
A.

Policy Rationales for Activities Restrictions: A Framework
for Analysis of the Corporate Structure Debate

Unlike most other businesses in the United States, national banks
and their affiliates historically have not been free to engage in any activity
they may choose. Rather, their activities have been limited to those
permitted by statute or approved by a federal banking regulator under certain
circumstances. The starting point for identifying the permissible activities
of national banks is Section 24 (Seventh) of the National Bank Act,27 which
authorizes banks to engage in the "business of banking" and activities
incidental thereto. In addition to this provision, which is general in nature,
there are other sections of the National Bank Act and other federal banking
laws that expressly empower or expressly prohibit national banks from
engaging in certain lines of business. Examples of express powers that
existed prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley include the authorization in Section 92
of the National Bank Act to act as insurance agents or brokers only in towns
with less than 5000 inhabitants;28 the grant of authority in Section 92a of the
National Bank Act to exercise trust powers to the extent that such activity
does not contravene state law;29 and the ability to make loans secured by real
27
28
29

See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1999).
See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1999).
See 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1999).
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estate granted by Section 371(a) of the Federal Reserve Act. 30 The most
prominent examples of express prohibitions that existed prior to Gramm
Leach-Bliley include the Glass-Steagall Act ("Glass-Steagall"), which
effectively barred national banks from engaging in many securities
underwriting and dealing activities and limited the extent to which bank
affiliates may engage in such activities, among other things,31 and the strict
limits imposed in Section 29 of the National Bank Act on the ability of
national banks to buy, own, and sell real estate, effectively barring national
banks from engaging in real estate development activities except
development of bank premises.32 The activities of bank affiliates, including
national bank affiliates, are also restricted by federal law. The most notable
example prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley was Section 1843(c)(8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act,33 which limits the activities of non-bank affiliates in
a holding company structure to those deemed "closely related to banking."
Viewed collectively, these statutory provisions severely limit the ability of
national banks and their affiliates to engage in nonbanking financial
activities and bar such banks from engaging in commercial activities.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley removed or amended some of those restrictions but did
not completely deregulate the area of activities restrictions for national banks
and their affiliates.
The reasons for the high level of regulation of bank activities are
complex and not completely understood. The same can be said of other
areas of U.S. banking regulation as well.
The public policy reasons
supporting banking regulation are sometimes difficult to discern and there is
much disagreement in the literature about what these are, both in general and
in the case of specific legislation. In general, however, it appears that the
primary economic reason for banking regulation is that banking is prone to
30 See 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1999).
31 The Glass-Steagall Act, part of the Banking Act of 1933, contained four
sections limiting the securities activities of banks and bank affiliates. Gramm-Leach
Bliley repealed two of these provisions, §§ 20 and 32. Section 16 prohibits
underwriting, selling and dealing in securities subject to certain exceptions. See 12
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (I 999). Section 21 prohibits taking deposits and engaging in
commercial banking by investment banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(l) (1999). Section
20 prohibited affiliations between banks and firms engaged principally in the
underwriting of stocks or other securities. See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999).
Section 32 prohibited individuals involved in investment banking serving as officers,
directors or employees of banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 78 (repealed 1994).
32 See 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1999).
33 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1999).
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market failure; Le., a tendency toward inherent instability and economic
concentration, which is more costly to society than the costs of regulating the
The market imperfections inherent in banking are
banking system. 34
believed to be attributable to two factors. One factor is the existence of
economies of scale 35 which, if substantial, could lead to concentration,
reduction in competition, and aggregation of capital in the hands of a few.
The other factor is the inherent instability attributable to the mismatch in the
asset and liability sides of commercial bank balance sheets.36 Although
many bank depositors are entitled to withdraw their funds on demand, most
bank assets are not liquid. The result is that banks are susceptible to the risk
of insolvency if many depositors attempt to withdraw their funds
simultaneously in a bank run. 37 The fear is that runs on individual banks can
lead to widespread financial panic, which will affect the entire banking
system and ultimately, lead to a contraction of economic activity.38
U.S. banking regulation is not the product of economic
considerations alone. In addition, political and social concerns about the
activities of banks and their effect on society have also held sway. For
example, the traditional preference in U.S. banking law for small, local
institutions is attributable to the agrarian beginnings of the U.S. economy
and the chronic scarcity of capital available to the agricultural sector. Fear
that money center banks would drain money out of the countryside and into
industrial concerns led to efforts by agrarian interests to limit consolidation
in the banking industry, which was the prevailing trend until quite recently.3 9
Several public policy rationales have emerged from these concerns.
The most significant are preserving the safety and soundness of the banking
and monetary system, ensuring the fair and impartial allocation of credit, and

See S. KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE
284 (1993).
35 If operating economies of scale exist, total costs increase less than
proportionately to output, leading to a decrease in average unit costs as output
increases.
36 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit Insurance, The Implicit
Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure ofBanks' Assets and
Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON REG. I, at 2 (1995).
37 Due to fractional reserve banking, banks are required to maintain only a small
fraction of their assets in cash or near-cash items.
38 See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 34, at 288.
39 See DWIGHT B. CRANE ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF BANKING DEREGULATION 17
20 (1983).
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limiting the size of banks.40 All three of these rationales have been used to
justify limiting banks to the traditional core banking activities of issuing
notes, accepting deposits, and extending loans.
By far the most frequently encountered rationale is safety and
soundness, which underlies a very large part of banking regulation. The
purpose of safety and soundness regulation is not to prevent individual banks
from failing,4I but rather to avoid the destabilizing effect on the economy
that is linked to financial panics triggered by bank failures. Federal deposit
insurance42 has had a stabilizing effect on the banking system, for it lessens
the likelihood that depositors will attempt to convert their deposits into
currency in a financial panic. 43 However, it has not eliminated the need for
safety and soundness regulation entirely because of the adverse
consequences that flow from bank failures and this policy continues to be a
major focus of banking regulation.
A second rationale for banking regulation-ensuring the impartial
allocation of credit-has emerged from the significant rote that banks playas
sources of capital in our society.44 Underlying this policy concern is the
See LiTAN, supra note 8, at 11-12 (1987).
This would have the effect of protecting incumbent management and
shareholders, who are arguably responsible for the poor condition of the bank. See
SPONG, supra note 3, at 11.
42 Federal deposit insurance was introduced in the Banking Act of 1933, and the
FDIC was formed to administer the program and regulate state nonmember banks
that had such insurance. See 12 U.S.C. §24 et seq (1999).
43 A distinction is drawn in the economic literature between bank runs and bank
panics. A bank run occurs when depositors of a particular institution attempt to
liquidate their deposits in response to concerns about the stability of that bank, but
then redeposit those funds elsewhere. There is not necessarily a destabilizing effect
on the financial system because bank reserves remain constant. A bank panic occurs
when depositors attempt to convert their deposits into currency. This has the net
effect of reducing reserves for the entire banking system and causing a contraction
of economic activity. The causal relationship between bank panics and economic
downturns is unclear but the two phenomena have often occurred in tandem. See
Ellis Tallman, Some Unanswered Questions About Bank Panics, FED. REs. BANK OF
ATLANTA, ECON. REv., Nov.lDec. 1988, at 2-17. Although financial panics
occurred in the last 1800s and early 1900s, the advent of federal deposit insurance
has eliminated bank panics, although bank runs still occur. See COOPER & FRASER,
supra note 34, at 288.
44 Commercial banks serve as financial intermediaries in funneling funds from
savers to those who need capital. See MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET, 13
16 (3rd ed. 1990).
40

41
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belief that banks should allocate capital based on strictly neutral economic
criteria in order to maximize economic efficiency and ensure that all
qualified parties have equal access to credit. One type of regulation that is
the product of this policy concern is strict regulation of conflict of interest
transactions involving extensions of credit to insiders and affiliates.
A third rationale is limitations on concentration in the banking
industry. The concern underlying this policy is clearly linked to the
economic rationale for banking regulation discussed above, as well as
political and social concerns about the dangers of a very few institutions
having control over vast aggregations of capital.
These public policy rationales are useful tools in explaining banking
regulation in general terms, but they are sometimes difficult to apply in
particular cases. The reasons that certain laws were adopted in the first place
may be shrouded by the mists of time, if in fact there were clearly
discernible reasons to begin with. Some regulation can best be explained as
the product of historical accident and political compromise, rather than
rational policy choices. A case in point is Glass-Steagall, which was long
understood to be the product of concerns about the impact on commercial
banks of the activities of their securities affiliates.4s Such activities were
believed to be a precipitating factor in the stock market crash that led to the
Great Depression and to the banking crisis that preceded passage of the
Banking Act of 1933:46 According to the Supreme Court, speaking in one of
the earliest cases involving a challenge to the restrictions imposed by Glass
Steagall, the policy basis for the legislation was a determination by Congress
that "policies of competition, convenience, or expertise which might
otherwise support the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking
business were outweighed by the hazards, and financial dangers, that arise
when commercial banks engage in the activities proscribed by the Act."47
These included not only "the obvious danger that a bank might invest its own
assets in frozen or otherwise imprudent stock or security investments," but
also the more "subtle hazards" associated with entry into the securities
business by a bank affiliate.48 The Court was referring to conflict of interest
transactions which a bank might be compelled to enter into to assist its
securities affiliate and which would impair a bank's ability to function as an
See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,629-630 (1971).
See Pub. L. No. 106-55,48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered Sections of
12 U.S.C. Chapters 2,3, and 6).
47 See leI v. Camp, 401 U.S., at 630.
48 See id.
4S
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impartial source of credit, including unsound loans by the bank to the
affiliate, customers of the affiliate or the company whose stock was
underwritten by the affiliate. 49
This long.standing view of the policy basis for Glass-Steagall has
been challenged by recent scholarship. Some scholars have questioned the
traditional view that the activities of securities affiliates, in combination with
conflict of interest transactions entered into by banks as a consequence or
such affiliations, were the cause of the banking crisis of the 1930's. 50 Other
scholars have offered alternative explanations of the legislation, claiming
that it represents the triumph of Senator Glass' strong belief that commercial
banks should return to their core business of making working capital loans,51
or that it attests to the lobbying strength of the investment banking industry,
which supported Glass-Steagall in order to limit competition in the
underwriting business from commercial banks.52 A number of scholars have
questioned whether legislation passed during the Depression still adequately
serves the public,53 arguing that changed economic conditions should result
in a reordering of the policy behind banking regulation and corresponding
changes in the law. 54 This wide-spread questioning of the continuing
viability of Glass-Steagall led to calls for its repeal. One of the major
accomplishments of Gramm-Leach-Bliley is that it repealed Glass-Steagall
in part.
The corporate structure debate has taken place largely in the context
of Congressional consideration of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and predecessor
financial modernization bills, which proposed to amend or repeal not only
Glass-Steagall and the National Bank Act relating to activities restrictions.
It was largely conceded in such debates that the new securities and insurance

49

See id. at 631.

50 See GEORGE J. BENSTON,
BANKING, at 20-121 (1990).

THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT

See Daniel C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process:
The Revisionist Role o/the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv.

51

672,693-694 (1987).
52 See Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial
Function: The Dilemma o/Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, at 15-20 (1984).
53 See LITAN & RAUCH, supra note 2, at 33-59.
54 See LITAN & RAUCH, supra note 2, at 10 (arguing that fmancial market
regulation should emerge from the shadow of the Depression, with its emphasis on
market segmentation and failure containment and start to focus on encouraging
competition and failure containment).
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activities requiring a bank to take risk as a principal, and not merely as an
agent, should not be conducted within the bank itself but rather in a
separately incorporated entity. The open question, which occupied countless
hours of debate in front of various Congressional committees, concerned
where such separate entity may be located within the corporate structure of
the bank. Prior to passage of Gramm-Leach-B1iley, the two choices
available under U.S. banking law and regulatory agency practice were the
bank holding company affiliate and the bank operating subsidiary.55 The
origin of the debate over corporate structure can be traced to actions taken by
federal banking regulators making such choices available for new activities.
The traditional choice has been the bank holding company affiliate. Bank
holding company affiliates have long been thought to be able to engage in
nonbanking financial activities that are beyond the pale for banks to engage
in directly. This conclusion is based upon a comparison of the wording of
12 U.S.C. Section 24 (Seventh), governing the powers of national banks,
with the wording of 12 U.S.C. Section 1843(c)(8), governing the nonbanking
activities of bank holding company affiliates. Section 24 (Seventh) permits
banks to engage in "the business of banking," while Section 1843(c)(8)
permits bank holding company affiliates to engage in activities that are
"closely related to banking." This difference in wording appears to permit a
broader range of activities for bank holding company affiliates than for
national banks. 56 The Board approved various non banking activities to be
conducted in such affiliates on the authority of Section 1843(c)(8) by
regulation and by order.57 The Board argued in congressional hearings on
financial modernization legislation that the only appropriate vehicle for new
activities was the bank holding company affiliate and contended that the
bank operating subsidiary should not be used for this purpose.
In contrast to the bank holding company affiliate, which is well
established as a vehicle for nonbanking activities, the bank operating
subsidiary is a relatively new arrival on the scene. The OCC took the
position in its rulemakings and orders that such subsidiaries could be used
for nonbanking financial activities that national banks may not engage in
55 Recently, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has permitted use of
limited liability companies by national banks to structure non-banking activities in a
joint venture format. See Russell J. Bruemmer, LLes: A Vehicle for Joint Venturing
Non-Banking Activities, 15 No.7 BANKING POL'y REp. 1 (1996).
56 See JONATHAN MACEY & GEOFFREY MILLER, BANKING LAW, 365 (2nd ed.
1997).
57 See MALLOY, supra note 17, at 186-190.
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directly, such as underwriting bank ineligible securities, and has argued this
view in Congressional testimony. The Treasury Department and FDIC also
supported this view in Congressional hearings.
The debate over appropriate corporate structure has largely centered
on the power to engage in securities underwriting, and accordingly that will
be the focus of this article. Further, the article will focus on national banks,
although the Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise on the corporate structure
issue will impact other types of banks as well. It is recent actions taken by
the acc to expand the powers of national bank operating subsidiaries that
led to the debate. The acc and the Board have divergent views in the
debate and it seems appropriate that the focus should be where their
regulatory authority overlaps, namely in regulating banking organizations
that contain national banks.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise on corporate structure for
new financial activities for banks presents an opportunity to assess which
policy considerations are driving the form that banking legislation takes, and
whether appropriate policy choices are being made. The confusion about the
policy foundations of banking law discussed above is not just a matter of
historic interest, but is still evident today.
Very often in recent
Congressional debates about financial modernization, there has been
disagreement about what the guiding principles should be. At times, the
same public policy rationale has been used to justify widely disparate
positions. This can be interpreted in several ways. It may mean that the
policy rationale is not well-understood. It can also mean that the problem
being addressed by the proposed legislation is so complex that it is unclear
how public policy analysis should apply to it. Finally, it can mean that
something else is being beneath the guise of public policy. Sometimes, one
is left with the uncomfortable feeling that the public interest will not be well
served by the choices that are being made in the process of legislative
reform.
The policies that have been most frequently mentioned in the
corporate structure debate include two of the traditional rationales mentioned
above, namely safety and soundness and ensuring the impartial allocation of
credit by avoiding conflict of interest transactions. Both of these rationales
will be discussed in Part IV. The third traditional rationale mentioned above,
avoiding excessive concentrations of economic power, has not been a
specific focus of the debate. It should be noted, however, that community
groups testifying in front of Congress about financial modernization have
expressed their concern about the formation of large financial
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conglomerates. 58 Two additional rationales relevant to the debate will also
be discussed in Part IV, namely limiting the spread of the federal safety net
subsidy and maintaining the regulatory authority of the Board in order to
preserve its ability to act as lender of last resort and deal with systemic risk.
The first of these arguments, limiting spread of the federal safety net
subsidy, has emerged as the primary argument for exclusive use of the
holding company affiliate. The policy basis for the argument seems to
consist of two components. One is that taxpayers bear the cost of the federal
safety net subsidy and should not be required to pay for risk associated with
new activities of banks that go beyond what the federal deposit insurance
scheme was intended to protect, namely small depositors' funds. The other
is that permitting the spread of the subsidy to new activities will distort
competition in the marketplace by giving an advantage to commercial banks
at the expense of other financial institutions offering near equivalents of
bank services.
The other argument relating to preserving the regulatory authority of
the Federal Reserve has not been previously discussed in the literature on the
corporate structure debate. It is an argument in favor of use of the holding
company affiliate, if not in all cases, at least in the case of very large banks
whose failure might pose risks to the financial system as a whole. For the
most part, these are banks that are already within a holding company
structure. The exact parameters of this policy argument are difficult to
define, because the argument has been only hinted at in Congressional
debate and has never been fully explored in a public forum. However, this
policy is of such critical importance that it cannot be ignored in the corporate
structure debate.
The next section of this Part II will explore the origins of the
corporate structure debate in actions by federal banking regulators permitting
new financial activities, including underwriting bank ineligible securities, by
national bank affiliates. Gramm-Leach-Bliley changed the landscape of
activities restrictions to a significant degree and foreclosed the need for the
regulatory approval process through which deregulation in activities
restrictions had been largely achieved. While such developments are now
primarily of historical interest due to Gramm-Leach-B1iley, reviewing such .

See Finance Services Restructuring: Hearings on the Financial Services Act of
1998 Before the Comm. on Banking, House, and Urban Affairs, 105 th Congo (1998)
(testimony of Ralph Nader) (testimony of Allen 1. Fishbein, General Counsel of The
Ctr. For Community Change and Dir. of the Center's Neighborhood Revitalization
Project).
58
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regulatory developments is nevertheless crucial for understanding how the
issue arose and for shedding light on the policy issues underlying the debate .
The focus will be on the most recent developments that gave rise to the
corporate structure debate in Congress.
B.

Deregulation of Activities Restrictions Applicable to
National Banks and their Affiliates through Action by
Federal Banking Regulators

In the years immediately preceding Gramm-Leach-Bliley, there was
a gradual increase in the permissible activities of national banks and their
affiliates under existing law and without any statutory amendments that
expressly authorized new activities or removed existing prohibitions. This
was achieved through an expansive reading of the statutory restrictions on
bank activities by federal banking regulators charged with approving new
lines of business for banks and their affiliates. Most noteworthy are the
developments with respect to the interpretation of national bank powers
under Section 24 (Seventh) of the National Bank Act by the acc,59
59 The language of Section 24 (Seventh) is vague and has been interpreted in a
variety of ways by courts and commentators, with considerable disagreement over
what activities are covered. See Edward L. Symons, Jr., The Business ofBanking in
Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 676, 678-684 (1983) (analysis of
narrow and broad views of bank powers); see also Ralph F. Huck, What is the
Banking Business?, Bus. LAW. (January 1966) 537-554, at 537-539 (criticism of
narrow view); Richard Beatty, What Are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of
National Bank Services?, 86 BANKING LJ. 3, 19 (1969) (description of broad view);
Harfield, Sermon on Genesis 17:20; Exodus 1:10 (A Proposal for Testing the
Propriety of Expanding Bank Services, 85 BANKING L.J. 565, 567 (1968) (arguing
for broad view). Prior to the decision in Nations Bank of North Carolina, N.A. v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. ("V ALIC"), 513 U.S. 251 (1995), there was no definitive
interpretation of the meaning of Section 24 (Seventh) by the Supreme Court. Other
federal courts read the language fairly restrictively, often in a way that seemed
consistent with the narrow view of national bank powers. See Arnold Tours Inc. v.
Camp, 474 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972). The legal landscape changed radically with the
decision in VALIC, in which the Supreme Court stated that the business of banking
for national banks is not restricted to the five specifically enumerated powers, but
includes other activities that the Comptroller deems to be part of the business of
banking, within reasonable bounds. See 513 U.S. 251, 258, fn. 2. The acc seized
upon the language in VALIC as an affirmation of its authority to determine the
boundaries of permissible powers for national banks. It can be inferred from recent
acc activity, including rulemakings and rulings on applications to engage in new
activities, that the acc will be aggressive in exercising its discretion to widen the
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including the power to own and conduct nonbanking activities in operating
subsidiaries, and the interpretation of Section 20 of Glass-Steagall and
Section lS43(c)(S) of the Bank Holding Company Act by the Board.6o
Deregulation through the regulatory approval process was
controversial. On numerous occasions, approval by a federal bank regulator
of a bank's application to engage in a new activity, directly or through a
subsidiary or an affiliate, was challenged by competitors in litigation in the
federal courts. Many of these regulatory approvals were upheld by federal
In addition to litigation challenges
courts, including the Supreme Court.61
scope of permissible activities. Recent developments with respect to operating
subsidiaries are discussed infra. In addition, the chief counsel of the OCC has
published her views on the outer limits of national bank powers and incidental
activities, which is based on an analysis of VALle and other court cases on national
bank powers. See Julie L. Williams & Mark P. Jacobsen, The Business ofBanking:
Looking to the Future, 50 Bus. LAW. 783, 785 (1995); see also Julie L. Williams &
James E. F. Gillespie, Jr., The Business ofBanking: Looking to the Future - Part II,
52 Bus. LAW. 1279, 1285 (1997). These tests have now become the standard used
by the Comptroller in its corporate decisions on new activities. See Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter #743 (October 17, 1996)(found at
1996 WL 636764).
60 These developments will be discussed infra in Section II.B.I.
61 The development in the case of securities activities has been dramatic. The first
significant decision in ICI v. Camp, supra note 45, was a defeat for the Comptroller
with the Supreme Court overturning an approval allowing a national bank to offer
shares of a common investment fund to the public on the grounds that the proposed
activity violated Sections 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall. After Camp, however, the
Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts have affirmed regulatory
authorization of banks andior their affiliates and subsidiaries to engage in various
securities activities including, among other things: acting as investment advisers to
closed-end investment companies, Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450
U.S. 46 (1981); retail securities brokerage activities, Securities Indus. Ass'n. v.
Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984); commercial paper placement, Securities
Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137 (1984), Securities Indus. Ass'n.
v. Board of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C.Cir. 1986) (on remand from U.s.
Supreme Court); providing automatic stock purchase services, New York Stock
Exch., Inc v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated (sub nom. New York
Exch., Inc. v. Bloom), 562 F.2d 736 (D.C.Cir. 1977); providing securities brokerage
services and investment advice in combination, Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of
Governors, 821 F.2d 810 (D.C.Cir. 1987); underwriting and dealing in certain bank
eligible securities, including mortgage-backed securities, government-issued
securities, and municipal revenue bonds, 73 F.R.B. 473 (1987), affd (sub nom.
Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors), 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
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by competitors, some U.S. Congressmen charged that the process of
deregulation through the regulatory process was flawed, claiming that it was
a "piecemeal" approach in which regulatory "loopholes" were exploited. 62
They asserted that action needed to be taken by Congress in order for the
deregulation of activities restrictions to be legitimate. 63 Such statements
implied that the process was inefficient, corrupt and possibly even dangerous
for the banking system. Such criticisms overlooked two important aspects.
First, the federal regulators' approvals were based upon interpretations of
statutory language, which were upheld as reasonable by federal courts in
most cases. Second, federal banking regulators acted with due regard for
considerations of prudential regulation, including safety and soundness and
avoiding the possibility of conflict of interest transactions, by imposing
special conditions on such approvals. The deregulation of activities
restrictions through the regulatory approval process prior to Gramm-Leach
Bliley will be discussed in detail below.

1.

Bank Holding Company Affiliates
a.

Use of Holding Company Affiliates for Nonbanking
Activities

Prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the holding company affiliate was the
traditional vehicle for expansion by banks into non banking financial
activities that were impermissible for a bank to engage in directly, including
underwriting bank ineligible securities. This section will focus on the state
of the law prior to passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and will not describe
486 U.S. 1059 (1988); underwriting and dealing in commercial paper, Securities
Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors, 847 F.2d 890 (D.C.Cir. 1988); and selling
mortgage passthrough certificates, Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034
(2d Cir. 1989).
62 Representative Marge Roukema, a member of the House Banking Committee,
wanted to hold Congressional hearings on the approval by the OCC of revenue bond
underwriting through a national bank operating subsidiary, calling the action
"piecemeal" and likely to interfere with Congress' ability to "pass financial reform
legislation." See Carter H. Golembe, How Important is Congress in the Drive to
Modernize Banking, 17 No.3 BANKING POL'y REp. 1 (1996).
63 Representative Roukema suggested the House Banking Committee urge the
bank regulatory agencies to take no action on banking modernization because "they
have got to understand that we ultimately will be writing this legislation." Jaret
Seiberg, House Vote on Reform Not Likely Until Spring, AM. BANKER, Nov. 2,
1997, at 1.
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changes brought about by the new legislation. However. it must be noted
that Gramm-Leach-Bliley provides for the establishment of a new type of
bank holding company called a financial holding company that may engage
in a wide range of financial activities previously unavailable or available
only to a limited extent through the regulatory approval process. Although
Gramm-Leach-Bliley does not eliminate the traditional bank holding
company. most banks will likely choose to become financial holding
companies in order to engage in expanded financial activities if they can
meet the conditions set forth in the statute. Therefore. the regulatory
approval process described in this Section is primarily of historical interest.
Although Section 1843 of the Bank Holding Company Act generally
prohibits banks in a holding company structure from being affiliated with
nonbank subsidiaries.64 pursuant to Section 1843(c)(8), the Board. by order
or regulation. after notice and opportunity for public comment. may permit a
holding company to own shares of a company engaged in activities
determined to be "closely related to banking."65 In addition, the proposed
activity must meet a second test, namely whether the public benefits of such
new activity will outweigh any potential adverse effects. 66 Pursuant to this
grant of authority. the Board permitted bank holding company subsidiaries
to engage in some limited forms of nonbanking activities pursuant to
individual orders and through regulation. namely the so-called "laundry
liSt"67 in Board Regulation Y, which governs the operation of bank holding

Bank holding companies are prohibited from owning or controlling, directly or
indirectly, the voting shares of any company that is not a bank, as defined in the
statute. See 12 U.S.C. § IS43(a) (1999).
•
65 The statute states that the activity must be found "to be so closely related to
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." See
12 U.S.C. § IS43(c)(S) (1999).
66 See id. This test was added by the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding
Company Act and require the Board to determine whether the performance of
non banking activities by an affiliate of a bank holding company can reasonably be
expected to produce benefits to the public such as greater convenience, increased
competition, or gains in efficiency. that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as
undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of
interest, or unsound banking practices.
67
12 C.F.R. § 225.2S. According to the Board, the "laundry list" is intended to
serve the purpose of providing a convenient and detailed list of most of the activities
that the Board has found to be closely related to banking and therefore permissible
for bank holding companies. 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9301-9302 (1997).

64
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companies. 68 The "laundry list" is expansive in its scope, especially after
amendments that were made in 1997 as part of a comprehensive revision of
Regulation y'69 Bank holding company affiliates were permitted to engage
in a wide variety of nonbanking activities by virtue of this authority,70
See 12 C.F.R. Part 225 (1999).
69 See Federal Reserve System, Final Rule, Bank Holding Companies and Change
in Bank Control (Regulation Y) (February 28, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 9290 (1997).
The changes were the product of a comprehensive review of Regulation Y
mandated by the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act
of 1994, see 12 U.S.C. § 4803 (1999), in order to improve efficiency, reduce
unnecessary costs, and eliminate unwarranted constraints on credit availability. See
61 Fed. Reg. 47242 (1996). The most significant amendments to Regulation Y fall
into one of four categories. First, changes to application and notice procedures for
both bank and nonbank acquisitions were made. Among other things, the new rules
permit a streamlined review process for bank and non-bank acquisitions meeting
certain qualifying criteria, eliminate the prior notice and approval requirements of
the Bank Holding Company Act for bank holding companies meeting certain
qualifying criteria to engage de novo in any nonbanking activity approved by the
Board by regulation, and establish a streamlined review process for engaging de
novo in nonbanking activities previously approved by the Board by order. See 62
Fed. Reg. 9290, 9290-9293 (1997). See 12 C.F.R. Part 225 (1999). Second, the
scope of permissible nonbanking activities was broadened. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290,
9301 (1997), 12 C.F.R. § 225.22 (1999). Third, many regulatory restrictions on
nonbanking activities were eliminated. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9302 (1997). Fourth,
tying restrictions applicable to bank holding companies and their bank and nonbank
affiliates were removed or liberalized. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9312 (1997); 12
C.F.R. § 225.7 (1999). Miscellaneous changes to reduce the regulatory burden of
complying with Regulation Y were made. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9316-18 (1997).
70 Among the permissible non banking activities that were added to the laundry
"list" of activities deemed closely related to banking are riskless principal
transactions, private placement services, foreign exchange trading for a bank holding
company's own account, dealing and related activities in gold, silver, platinum and
palladium, employee benefits consulting, career counseling services, asset
management, servicing and collection activities, acquiring and resolving debt in
default, printing and selling checks and providing real estate settlement services.
See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9302 (1997); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (1999). In addition, the
scope of permissible derivatives and foreign exchange activities has been broadened
to give bank holding companies the same ability to conduct these activities as banks
and certain restrictions applicable to bank holding companies that were not
applicable to banks are also removed. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9302 (1997). 12
C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii) (1999). The revisions also removed a significant number
of restrictions contained in Regulation Y that were considered outmoded, had been
68

354

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

VOL. 19: 329

including securities and insurance activities that require the affiliate to act in
an agency capacity.?l Safety and soundness concerns for banks arising as a
result of being affiliated with a company engaged in nonbanking activities
are addressed in Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, which
prohibits certain transactions, including lending and purchases and sales of
assets, between banks and affiliates. 72 These firewalls are intended to
insulate banks from the risks associated with conflict of interest transactions,
that might flow from such affiliations.
The 1997 Regulation Y amendments indicated that the Board was
prepared to deregulate activities restrictions applicable to bank holding
companies on an ongoing basis. Several principles guided the Board's
reform of nonbanking activities restrictions, most importantly the idea that
bank holding companies should be permitted to conduct nonbanking
activities to the fullest extent permissible under the Bank Holding Company
Act and that Regulation Y should be flexible enough to allow for
development within the banking industry of permissible activities without
creating unnecessary additional filing burdens. 73 The Board indicated that it
would be proactive in authorizing new activities, especially as new activities
are permitted for banks or as new financial services are developed,
reiterating its view that under the Bank Holding Company Act, bank holding
companies are authorized to conduct activities beyond the scope of activities
that insured banks may conduct.74
The Board also conducted a
comprehensive revision of the restrictions that govern the conduct of
permissible nonbanking activities. A guiding principle in this regard was
superseded by Board order or did not apply to insured depository institutions
conducting the same activity. Examples of such restrictions include those relating to
investment advisory activities of bank holding companies with respect to mutual
funds and other investment companies, data processing and management consulting
activities, and acquisitions of assets used in lending related activities in the ordinary
course of business. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9302-9305 (1997).
71 Examples are insurance agency for credit insurance, see 12 C.F.R. §
225.28(b)(l1)(l999), and securities brokerage and investment advisory services, see
12 C.F.R § 225.28(b)(7)(1999).
72 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-l (1999).
73 See 61 Fed. Reg. 47242, 47243 (1996).
74 See id. The Board indicated in the release accompanying the final rule that it
would consider amending the laundry list as new activities are authorized for banks,
as experience with a narrowly defined activities indicated that the activity could be
more broadly defined or as developments occurred in technology or the marketplace
for financial products and services. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9303 (1997).
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that a bank holding company should not be subject to supervisory
restrictions on conducting an activity that would not apply to an insured
depository institution conducting the same activity. Another principle was
that supervisory principles should be governed by market developments and
the Board's experience and should be uniformly applied to insured
depository institutions and their affiliates on an interagency basis.7s
Although the changes to Regulation Y liberalizing nonbanking
activities restrictions were substantial, certain areas of activities restrictions
were not touched. The 1997 Regulation Y amendments failed to permit sales
of annuities and nationwide sales of insurance from small towns under 5000,
pursuant to 12 U.s.C. § 92, which had been previously authorized by the
acc for national banks,76 failed to treat municipal bonds as bank eligible
securities that could be underwritten in a Section 4(c )(8) subsidiary not
subject to gross revenue limitations rather than a Section 20 subsidiary,
failed to permit mutual fund underwriting and distribution through Section
20 subsidiaries or Section 4(c)(8) subsidiaries subject to gross revenue
limitations but with revenue based upon fee income rather than gross sales,
and failed to consider best efforts underwriting as an eligible activity
permissible for a Section 4(c)(8) subsidiary,?7

b.

Expansion of Permitted Securities Activities Througb
Use of Section 20 Subsidiaries.

Perhaps the most dramatic use of Board authority to expand bank
powers pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) was the issuance of so-called
Section 20 orders to various bank holding companies. Prior to Gramm
Leach-Bliley, Glass-Steagall prohibited national banks from underwriting or
dealing in all securities, with limited exceptions, most notably U.S.
government securities. 78 The limited category of securities which national
banks could underwrite and deal in without restriction are referred to as bank
ineligible securities. 79 In contrast, bank ineligible securities are those
securities that a national bank would not be permitted to underwrite or deal
See 61 Fed. Reg. 47242, 47243 (1996).
See Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). See
VALlC, supra note 59.
77 See Melanie L. Fein, Fed's Proposed Overhaul of Regulation Y Goes Far, But
Could Be Bolder, 15 BANKING POL'y REp. 4, 6-7 (1996).
78 See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1999).
79 The permissible securities activities of national banks are governed by
regulations set forth at 12 C.F.R. Part l.
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in. 8o Even though, prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Section 20 of Glass
Steagall prohibited affiliations of member banks of the Federal Reserve •
System 8l with corporations "engaged principally" in the securities business,
the Board orders permitted the bank holding company applicants to engage
in limited securities underwriting and dealing activities in bank ineligible
securities through nonbank subsidiaries. The Board determined that this •
activity was permissible under Section 1843(c)(8) of the BHeA because it
was closely related to banking. 82
The Board issued its first Section 20 order in 1987, when it approved
applications by three bank holding companies to underwrite and deal in
commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-backed securities,
and consumer-receivable-related securities (tier-one securities).83 In 1989,
the Board allowed five bank holding companies to underwrite and deal in all
debt and equity securities (tier-two securities).84 Subsequently, other bank
holding companies were granted authority to engage in underwriting and
dealing in bank ineligible securities through Section 20 subsidiaries on the
same terms as in the 1987 and 1989 orders. As of the end of 1996, forty-one
Section 20 subsidiaries were authorized to engage in underwriting and
dealing activities with respect to bank ineligible securities. 8s Fifteen of the
Section 20 subsidiaries had authority to underwrite and deal in tier-one
See 61 Fed. Reg. 68750 (1996).
81 See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999).
82 See 1987 Order, infra note 83, at 487.
83 See Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co., and Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed.
Res. Bulletin 473 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Order], afJ'd, Securities Industry Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1059 (l988)(Citicorp); see a/so Chemical New York Corp., Chase
Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust New York Corp., Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover
Corp., and Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 731 (1987) (approving
underwriting and dealing in consumer-receivable-related securities, after having
deferred decision for 60 days in its 1987 Order).
84 See J.P. Morgan & Co., The Chase Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust New York
Corp., Citicorp, and Security Pacific Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989)
[hereinafter 1989 Order], afJ'd, Securities Industries Ass'n v. Board of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
8S Revenue Limit on Bank Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding ,
Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities. See 61 Fed. Reg.
68750, 68751 (1996). More recent data is available in Section 20 Securities
Subsidiaries (last modified Mar. 4, 1999) (visited May 3, 1999)
<http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/generalinfo/section 20>.
80
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securities pursuant to the terms of the 1987 Order, Twenty-three Section 20
subsidiaries had authority to underwrite and deal in all tier-two securities and
three had authority to underwrite and deal in all debt securities, pursuant to
the terms of the 1989 Order.
The 1987 and 1989 Orders were based on an interpretation by the
Board of the phrase "engaged principally" in Section 20 of Glass-Steagall to
mean "substantial" or "primary."86 According to the Board, a holding
company affiliate of a bank could engage in a limited amount of securities
underwriting and dealing activity without being deemed to be "engaged
principally" in such activity for purposes of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall
Act,87 The Board devised a revenue test to determine whether a company is
"engaged principally" in underwriting and dealing for purposes of Section
20. The revenue test provided that a Section 20 subsidiary may not derive
more than a fixed percent of its total revenue from underwriting and dealing
in bank ineligible securities. 88 This fixed percent was originally set at 5%89
but has recently been raised to 25%, as described below.
In addition to these limitations, the Board imposed various
conditions or firewalls intended to guard against conflict of interest
transactions that might affect the safety and soundness of affiliated banks.
Twenty-eight firewalls were imposed in the original Section 20 orders,
which can be grouped into categories by common subject matter. 90 The most
86 61 Fed. Reg. 68750, 68751 (1996). An alternative meaning of principal,
namely "chief," "main," or "largest," which would have permitted up to 50 percent
of the Section 20 subsidiary's business to be derived from securities underwriting
and dealing was rejected by the Board, 1987 Order, supra note 83, at 477-78, 482
83.
87

ld

The Board arrived at this revenue test through a series of interpretive steps, in a
series of orders, See Bankers Trust New York Corporation, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138
(1987); 1987 Order, supra note 83; Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 75 Fed, Res.
Bull. 751 (1989); Order Approving Modifications to the Section 20 Orders, 79 Fed.
Res. Bull. 226 (1993).
89 See 1987 Order, supra note 83, at 485.
90 The categories included the following:
1) capital adequacy conditions, 2)
prohibitions and other limitations on credit extensions by a bank to customers of an
affiliated Section 20 subsidiary, 3) prohibition on director and officer interlocks
between banks and an affiliated Section 20 subsidiary, 4) required customer
disclosure by an underwriting subsidiary describing the difference between the bank
and such bank affiliate, 5) restrictions on marketing on behalf of a Section 20
subsidiary, 6) requirement that investment advice given by a bank regarding bank
88
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important limitations were those relating to capital adequacy, limitations on
credit extensions by a bank to customers of a Section 20 subsidiary, and
limitations on credit extensions by a bank to customers of a Section 20
subsidiary. As discussed below, the Board has recently removed these
firewalls and replaced them with a greatly simplified set of operating
standards.
c.

Recent Changes to Section 20 Subsidiary Restrictions.

In 1996 and 1997, the Board made two important revisions to the
conditions imposed in previous Board orders permitting limited securities
activities through Section 20 subsidiaries. First, the Board raised the limit on
income from bank ineligible securities from 10% to 25%.91 Second, the
Board modified the firewalls imposed in prior Section 20 orders, replacing
them with a series of eight operating standards.92 These changes signaled an
even greater willingness on the part of the Board to deregulate the conditions

ineligible securities underwritten by a Section 20 affiliate be accompanied by
disclosures about the affiliate's role, 7) limit on extension of credit and purchase of
assets involving a Section 20 subsidiary, 8) limitations on disclosure of customer
information between a bank and a Section 20 subsidiary, 9) requirement of reports;
10) requirement that securities activities be conducted only by the subsidiary for
which approval has been sought and prohibition on corporate reorganizations
without board consent, 11) prohibition on reciprocity arrangements between bank
holding companies intended to evade the firewall and limitations on discriminatory
arrangements in which Section 20 subsidiaries are favored over competitors, and 12)
requirement of a supervisory review by the Board prior to commencement of
approved securities activities. 62 Fed. Reg. 45295, 45297-45306 (1997). 62 Fed.
Reg. 2622 (1997).
91 See Federal Reserve System, Notice, Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible
Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and
Dealing in Securities (1996),61 Fed. Reg. 68750 [hereinafter Section 20 Notice].
The change, announced December 20, 1996, became effective March 6, 1997.
Section 20 subsidiaries would therefore be allowed to employ the 25% limit for the
first quarter of 1997. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Announcements, Increase in the Amount of Revenue that Section 20 Subsidiaries
May Derive from Underwriting and Dealing in Securities (1997), 83 Fed. Res. Bull.
(1997).
92 See Federal Reserve System, Final Conditions to Board Orders, Bank Holding
Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation V); Amendments to
Restrictions in the Board's Section 20 Orders, 62 Fed. Reg. 4529 (1997); Proposed
Rules, Proposed Conditions to Board Orders, 62 Fed. Reg. 2622 (1997).
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under which bank affiliates were permitted to underwrite and deal in bank
ineligible securities.

i.

Increase in Revenue Limit

The Board made the change because it had supervised Section 20
subsidiaries over a nine year period without significant problems and it
recognized that developments in the securities markets had occurred since
the revenue limitation was adopted in 1987.93 As a consequence, the Board
decided that a Section 20 subsidiary would not be engaged principally in
such activities so long as ineligible revenue did not exceed 25% of total
revenue. 94
The impact of this change was felt immediately with the
announcement of several acquisitions involving major financial services

93 See Section 20 Notice, supra note 91, at 68751. 61 Fed. Reg. 68750, 68751
(1996). The Board believed that the prior limit of 10% had unduly restricted the
underwriting and dealing activity of Section 20 subsidiaries to a level that fell short
of being "engaged principally" for purposes of Section 20, noting that changes in the
product mix that Section 20 subsidiaries are permitted to offer and developments in
the securities markets had affected the relationship between revenue and securities
activity since the original Section 20 orders in 1987. Id The Board further explained
its rationale by citing evidence that revenues of Section 20 subsidiaries related to
ineligible securities underwriting had increased without a corresponding increase in
the number or size of transactions, due to greater revenues generated in connection
with corporate debt activities The Board noted that the reason for higher revenues
on tier-two securities activities was related to higher risk but also to factors such as
financial innovation in structuring transactions, ability to foresee shifting public
needs gained from an experienced sales force, research on the issuer that is credited
by the market, the ability to use marketing expertise to avoid losses, and accuracy in
pricing. Id at 68753. It also noted that revenues related to eligible securities
activities had decreased without a corresponding decrease in level of activity, due to
lower commissions as a result of increased competition. Id.
94 The Board noted that it had not revised its legal interpretation of the term
"engaged principally" to mean "substantial" or "primary", rather than "chief',
"main" or largest." Id The Board also rejected the notion that the revenue limit
should not be raised because of the fact that several Section 20 subsidiaries were
among the largest underwriters in the U.S. or because banks would be permitted to
affiliate with the largest investment banks in the U.S. According to the Board, such
arguments were an attempt to reintroduce a market share limitation on securities
activities by Section 20 subsidiaries, an approach that was explicitly rejected by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a challenge to the original Board Section 20
order in 1987. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47,68 (2d
Crr. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (l988).
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finns, which were made possible only because of the change in the revenue
limit.95 This development suggests that the Board's revision to the revenue •
limit was not merely a response to market change, but also a facilitator of it.
ii.

Revision of Firewalls

The Board also substantially revised the limitations that had been •
imposed on operation of Section 20 subsidiaries pursuant to Board orders.96
The bulk of these limitations, or firewalls, were adopted in the 1987 Order.97
Other firewalls were added in the 1989 Order.98 The purpose of these
restrictions was to prevent the risks associated with securities underwriting
and dealing from being passed from a Section 20 subsidiary to an affiliated
insured bank, and "to mitigate the potential for conflicts of interest, unfair
competition, and other adverse effects that may arise from the affiliation of
commercial and investment banks."99
The Board noted it initially had imposed a "very conservative
regime" for firewalls due to the historical context in which such orders were
issued. Due to the long-standing separation between commercial and
investment banking effected by Glass-Steagall, the Board had little
experience supervising investment banks and was concerned about the
unknown risks that might be presented if affiliations between commercial
and investment banks were allowed. Such affiliations were thOUght by many
95 In April 1997, Bankers Trust New York Corp. announced plans to acquire the
securities fmn of Alex Brown Inc. of Baltimore, a deal made possible because of the
Board's move to raise the Section 20 revenue cap to 25%. See Niles S. Campbell,
Roukema Objects to Bank's Request to Underwrite Municipal Revenue Bonds, BNA
Banking Daily (Apr. 17, 1997). Other acquisitions included First Union of Wheat
First Butcher Singer Securities, BankAmerica of Robertson, Stephens & Co., CIBC
of Oppenheimer, and SBC Warburg of Dillon, Reed & Company. See John W.
Milligan, Bankers Who Would Be Brokers, U.S. BANKER, October 1997, at 26.
96 Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y);
Amendments to Restrictions in the Board's Section 20 Orders. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45,
295 (1997) [hereinafter Section 20 Firewall Amendments]. The changes were the
product of a comprehensive review of Regulation Y mandated by the Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. §
4803 (1999), in order to improve efficiency, reduce unnecessary costs, and
eliminate unwarranted constraints on credit availability. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45295,
45296 (1997).
97 See 62 Fed. Reg. 29545, 45296 (1997).
98

See id.

99

Jd.

.
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commentators at the time to have caused losses in the banking industry
before 1933, but recent research on this topic indicated this belief was
largely inaccurate,lOO The Board was uncertain about whether functional
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission of the broker-dealer
function of Section 20 subsidiaries would afford adequate protection)Ol
. Finally, statutory changes enacted since 1987 either duplicated some of the
firewalls or otherwise addressed the risks that the firewalls were formulated
to protect against. 102
When it adopted the firewalls in its Section 20
orders, the Board indicated that its concern about affiliations between
holding company subsidiaries and insured banks might abate with time and
that it would continue to review such restrictions as its experience in
supervising Section 20 subsidiaries expanded,l03 After conducting a
comprehensive review of the firewalls, the Board concluded that many of
them could be eliminated entirely and the rest could be incorporated in a
smaller number of operating standards.1 04 The Board noted that, in its
experience, the risks of securities underwriting and dealing had proven to be
manageable in a bank holding company framework, and that both bank

•

100 See

62 Fed. Reg. 2622 (1997).

tOI See id. at 2623.

The Board pointed to enactment of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act, which duplicated or overlapped many of the firewalls, enactment of risk-based
capital standards, and adoption of the Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of
Nondeposit Investment Products. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision; Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of
Nondeposit Investment Products (February 15, 1994), 1994 WL 836461 [hereinafter
Retail Sales Statement]. The four federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies have
issued a joint statement on retail sales of nondeposit investment products because the
agencies believed that retail customers must be fully informed about the risks
associated with mutual fund or other nondeposit investment products. Depository
institutions selling such products must now inform customers that the products: I)
are not FDIC-insured; 2) are not deposits or other obligations of the institution and
are not guaranteed by the institution, and 3) involve investment risks. The Statement
also outlines the steps banks and thrifts should take to minimize customer confusion.
According to the Board, this Statement is the primary means to avoid misleading
retail banking customers about the nature of the products they are purchasing. See
62 Fed. Reg. 2622, 2623 (1997).
103 See 62 Fed. Reg. 2622, 2623 (1997),
104 Technically, the Board rescinded the firewalls in the 1987 and 1989 Orders and
any other orders incorporating those conditions, See 62 Fed. Reg. 45295, 45306
(1997).
102 See id.
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holding companies and banks had undertaken and managed activities posing
similar risks for which no firewalls were used. lOS Most of the affiliation
risks between commercial and investment banking were in the Board's
opinion adequately addressed by general bank and bank holding company
laws and regulations, as well as by securities laws and regulations of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, National Association of Securities
Dealers, and securities exchanges applicable to every broker-dealer,
including Section 20 subsidiaries. 106 Those risks not adequately addressed
by existing laws and regulations, such as the risk that a customer might be
confused about whether a product was offered by an insured bank or an
uninsured affi liate, were covered by the new operating standards. I 07
To replace the firewalls that were rescinded, the Board established
eight operating standards, covering the following areas: capital,108 internal
controls,109 interlock restriction,lIo customer disclosure, III intra-day credit

lOS See 62 Fed. Reg. 2622, 2623 (1997).

106 See 62 Fed. Reg. 45295, 45297 (1997).

107 See id.
108 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(I) (1999). A bank holding company shall maintain
either adequate or strong capital depending on whether its Section 20 subsidiary is
underwriting tier-one or tier-two securities. A bank affiliate of a Section 20 must
remain well-capitalized or the Board may impose additional conditions. Special
capital rules apply to foreign banks.
109 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(2) (1999).
A bank holding company or foreign
bank operating a Section 20 subsidiary must cause its bank subsidiaries, branches
and agencies to adopt policies and procedures including risk exposure limits to
govern participating in transactions involving the securities subsidiary.
110 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(3) (1999). Directors, officers or employees of a
bank or thrift subsidiary of a bank holding company (or a bank or thrift subsidiary or
branch or agency of a foreign bank) shall not serve as a majority of the board of
directors or the chief executive officer of an affiliated Section 20 subsidiary.
Directors, officers or employees of a Section 20 subsidiary shall not serve as a
majority of the board of directors or the chief executive officer of an affiliated bank
or thrift subsidiary or branch or agency.
III See 12 C.F.R. § 225 .200(b)(4) (1999). A Section 20 subsidiary shall give its
retail customers the disclosures required by the Retail Sales Statement. See supra
note 102. Before expressing an opinion on a bank ineligible security being
underwritten or dealt in by an affiliated Section 20 subsidiary, directors, officers
and employees ofa bank, thrift, branch or agency must disclose the affiliate's role.
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extensions,112 restrictions on funding purchases of securities during
underwriting period,1I3 reporting requirements, 114 and foreign bank
The most important changes addressed the firewalls
compliance. I IS
regarding funding of a Section 20 subsidiary by an affiliated bank, credit
enhancements provided by a bank to issuers of securities underwritten by a
Section 20 affiliate, and loans provided by a bank to customers purchasing
products of Section 20 affiliates. These changes were thought to allow
Section 20 subsidiaries to operate more readily in conjunction with an
affiliated bank, thereby maximizing synergies, enhancing services, and
possibly reducing costs.1l6 In addition, the Board stated that a Section 20
subsidiary like any other subsidiary of a bank holding company must be
operated prudently. Prudent operation was deemed to include observing
corporate formalities, such as maintaining separate corporate and accounting
records, and instituting appropriate risk management, such as independent
trading and exposure limits consistent with parent company guidelines. 117
Both the increase in the revenue limit and the lowering of the
firewalls applicable to Section 20 subsidiaries signaled the Board's attempt
to strike a balance between the concerns of regulators, including safety and
soundness and consumer protection, and the interests of bankers in
remaining competitive in the marketplace. 1I8 The changes also indicated
1I2 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200{b){5) (1999). Intra-day credit extensions to a Section
20 subsidiary by an affiliated, bank, thrift, branch or agency must be on market
terms consistent with Section 23B of the Federal Reverse Act.
113 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(6) (1999). Banks, thrifts, branches and agencies
may not extend credit to a customer secured by or to fund the purchase of a bank
ineligible security currently or within the last 30 days underwritten by a Section 20
affiliate, except under limited circumstances.
114 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200{b)(7) (1999). Certain reports filed with securities
regulators must be filed with the Board along with Board forms required to monitor
compliance with the operating standards and Section 20 of Glass-Steagall.
liS See 12 C.F.R. § 22S.200(b)(8) (1999). Foreign banks must ensure that certain
transactions between their branches and agencies and Section 20 subsidiaries are on
terms consistent with Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.
116 See 62 Fed. Reg. 2622, 2623 (1997).
117 See 62 Fed. Reg. 45295, 45306 (1997).
118 The Board releases accompanying the proposed and final rule amending the
firewalls set forth in the Section 20 orders recognized the importance of economic
efficiency factors. In connection with the proposed rule, the Board stated that it
believed the proposed modifications would "allow section 20 subsidiaries to operate
more efficiently and serve their customers more effectively. These modifications
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what the future trend of Board actions would be. First, securities activities
were considered safe enough to be conducted in a non-bank affiliate of an
insured bank without the need for an elaborate system of controls. Second,
the existing legal framework, most notably Sections 23A and 23B of the
Federal Reserve Act and securities laws and regulations applicable to broker
dealer firms, was deemed sufficient to satisfy safety and soundness concerns.
Third, corporate separateness and the insulation that this affords banks from
safety and soundness problems were viewed favorably. The revisions also
indicated that the Board would be responsive to market developments. By
the time Gramm-Leach-Bliley was passed, the Board had become
increasingly proactive in deregulating activities restrictions.

2.

National Bank Operating Subsidiaries
a.

The New Part 5 Rules on Corporate Activities of
National Banks

The operating subsidiary option for new financial activities was
made possible due to 1996 amendments to acc regulations governing the
corporate activities of national banks and their operating subsidiaries
contained in Part 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 1l9 The most
would allow section 20 subsidiaries to operate more readily in conjunction with an
affiliated bank, thereby maximizing synergies, enhancing services, and possibly
reducing costs." 62 Fed. Reg. 2622 (Summary). In connection with the final rule,
the Board stated that "the narrower set of restrictions will be fully consistent with
safety and soundness and should improve operating efficiencies at section 20
subsidiaries and increase options for their customers." 62 Fed. Reg. 45295
(Summary). The Board was acting in response to a Congressional mandate under
the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 to
streamline its regulations to improve efficiency, reduce unnecessary costs, and
eliminate unwarranted constraints on credit availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 45295,45296
(1997).
119 12 C.F.R. Part 5 (1999). The changes became effective on December 31,1996.
The amendments adopted a risk-based approach so corporate applications and
corporate activities of national banks and their operating subsidiaries, with different
application procedures mandated depending on the type of proposed activity and the
financial and operational strength of the bank. See OCC, Rules, Policies and
Procedures for Corporate Activities, Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 60342 (1996). The
Part 5 changes were adopted as part of the OCC's ongoing regulatory review
program to reduce unnecessary burdens and costs for national banks. See OCC
Bulletin, Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Final Rules, OCC
96-71, December 17,1996.
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controversial change was adoption of a provision allowing operating
• subsidiaries to conduct activities that would be impermissible for a national
bank upon application to the OCC and approval on a case by case basis
("Operating Subsidiary Rule").120 The rule did not specify the types of
activities that might be approved, although it did require such activities to be
. "part of or incidental to the business of banking or otherwise authorized by
statute or otherwise authorized by statute."121 Former Comptroller Eugene
Ludwig, who was at the helm at the time, declined to speculate publicly
about the kinds of activities that the OCC might approve under the Operating
Subsidiary Rule, commenting only that the OCC had no commitment to
approving a particular activity, but would evaluate any applications on a
case-by-case basis following a comprehensive review of supervisory, policy
and legal concerns. 122 Commentators speculated that underwriting bank
ineJigibJe securities might be approved in this way, thereby offering banks an
alternative to the use of a holding company affiliate, i.e., a Section 20
subsidiary, for securities activities prohibited to banks under Glass
Steagall. 123 In fact, the OCC had approved several applications by national
banks to conduct municipal revenue bond underwriting through subsidiaries
under the Operating Subsidiary Rule by the time Gramm-Leach-Bliley was
See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f) (1999). For a discussion of these changes, see Joseph J.
Norton, The Glass-Steagall Act and Related Bank Legislative Refolll1 in the United
States: Non-Legislative Bank Regulation and Modernization - The Recent
Comptroller of the Currency "Op-Sub" Regulation, 14 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 1
(1998); James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries: Free At Last or More of the
Same? 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 651 (1997); McCoy, supra note 20, at § 8.06. Note,
National Bank Operating Subsidiaries: How Far Has the OCC Opened the Door to
Nonbanking Activities? 2 N.C. BANKING INST. (1998); Note, The New American
Universal Bank, ] 10 HARV. L. REv. 1310 (1997).
121 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(1) (1999). Under the Part 5 regulations, a national bank is
authorized to establish or acquire an operating subsidiary to conduct, or may
conduct in an existing operating subsidiary, activities that are part of or incidental to
the business of banking, as detelll1ined by the Comptroller pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §
24 (Seventh) (1998), and other activities pelll1issible for national banks or their
subsidiaries under other statutory authority. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(1) (1999).
122 See Ludwig Defends oee Authority to Act on Op Sub Proposal, 14 No.5
BANKING POL'y REp. 2 (1995) [hereinafter Ludwig].
123 See id. (noting that Ludwig has stated that Glass-Steagall clearly authorizes
national banks to establish Section 20 subsidiaries and that the OCC is expected to
allow operating subsidiaries to conduct virtually every activity that is pelll1issible for
a bank holding company). See also Ludwig Adopts Two-Year-Old Op Sub Proposal,
15 No. 23 BANKING POL'y REp. 2 (1996).
120
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adopted. This section will describe the state of the law prior to passage of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley. However, it should be noted that Gramm-Leach
Bliley provides for the establishment of financial subsidiaries by national
banks that may engage in underwriting bank ineligible securities, among
other things. Therefore, the regulatory approval process under the Operating
Subsidiary Rule described in this section is primarily of historical interest.
Applications under the Operating Subsidiary Rule differed from
other applications under the Part 5 rules in two significant respects. Banks
were subject to a higher level of scrutiny by the OCC during the approval
process than would be the case if they sought to conduct banking activities in
such subsidiary and were required to comply with special regulatory
safeguards. In general, a national bank seeking to acquire or establish, or
commence new activities in, an operating subsidiary is required to submit an
application and obtain prior OCC approval. 124 The OCC reviews the
application to determine whether the proposed activity is legally permissible
for an operating subsidiary, to ensure that the proposal is consistent with safe
and sound banking practices and OCC policy, and does not endanger the
safety or soundness of the parent national bank.l 25
Different application procedures apply under the Part 5 rules
depending on the novelty, complexity, and risk of the proposed activity and
the financial and operational capacities of the parent bank. 126 Applications
under the Operating Subsidiary Rule fell into the application category with
the most heightened level of scrutiny, requiring an extensive review process,
including public notice and comment on the application. 127
Numerous safeguards became applicable automatically to applicant
banks and operating subsidiaries for approvals under the Operating

See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(b) (1999).
See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1)(iii) (1999).
126 There are three categories of application procedures established. The first
category required after the fact notice to be given in order to engage in banking
related activities that the OCC has previously approved for operating subsidiaries on
a case by case basis and which are listed in the regulation. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(2)(i),
(ii) (1999). The second category provided for an expedited review process in order
to engage in activities that the OCC has previously approved on a case by case basis
but that are more complex and may require more specialized expertise than those
activities falling in the notice category, and therefore warrant prior OCC review. 12
C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3) (1999). A third category applied to approvals under the
Operating Subsidiary Rule. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f) (1999).
127 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f) (1999).
124
125
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Subsidiary Rule. 128 There were two categories of safeguards: 129 1) those
intended to ensure the subsidiary's independent legal status (corporate
requirement safeguards),130 and 2) those intended to protect the safety and
soundness of the parent bank when the subsidiary is engaged in principal
activities (supervisory requirement safeguards ).131
In addition to these built-in safeguards, the aee was permitted to
impose additional conditions on a case-by-case basis as deemed appropriate
depending on the particular bank or activity involved. 132 The purpose of this
61 Fed. Reg. 60342, 60351 (1996).
See id. at 60354.
130 The corporate requirement safeguards applicable to the operating subsidiary
included physical separation from the parent bank and compensation by the
subsidiary of subsidiary employees; holding out as a separate entity from the parent
bank in written material and in direct contact with customers; use of a different name
than the parent bank; adequate capitalization based on industry norms to support its
activities and to cover expenses and losses; maintenance of separate accounting and
corporate records; conduct of its operations pursuant to independent policies and
procedures intended to inform customers of separate status; arm's length terms in
service contracts with the parent bank; observance of corporate formalities; board
member banking expertise and independence from parent bank for at least one-third
of the subsidiary's board; internal controls at both the subsidiary and parent bank
level to manage the financial and operational risks associated with the subsidiary. 12
C.F.R. § 5.34(t)(2) (1999). The purpose of the corporate requirement safeguards
was to reduce the risk that the parent bank will be held liable for losses of its
subsidiary through attempts to pierce the corporate veil of limited liability. 61 Fed.
Reg. 60342, 60354 (referring to prior OCC practice requiring such corporate
separateness for operating subsidiaries engaged in derivatives activities and to FDIC
proposed rules for real estate subsidiaries of insured state banks). See FDIC,
Proposed Rules, 12 C.F.R. § 362, Activities and Investments ofinsured State Banks,
621 Fed. Reg. 43486, 43491 (proposed Aug. 23, 1996).
131 The supervisory requirement safeguards included reduction of the bank's capital
and total assets by an amount equal to the bank's equity investment in the subsidiary
and non-consolidation of the subsidiary's assets and liabilities with those of the
bank; application of Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. §§
371 c, 371 c-I) to transactions between the bank and the subsidiary and OCC
enforcement of such standards; and status of the parent bank as an eligible bank both
prior to and after commencement of the activity. The purpose of the supervisory
requirement safeguards was to contain risk, reduce potential conflicts of interest,
ensure the safe and sound operation of the parent bank, and, in the case of the arm's
length standards, eliminate the possibility of a subsidy flowing from the bank to its
subsidiary. 61 Fed. Reg. 60342, 60354 (1996).
132 See id. at 60351.
128

129

368

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

VOL.

19: 329

approach was to ensure that the OCC would be able to fulfill its obligation to
identify, manage, and control risk. 133
b.

The Controversy Over the Operating Subsidiary Rule

The Operating Subsidiary Rule was extremely controversial,
eliciting the greatest number of comments in response to publication of the
proposed changes to the Part 5 rules. 134 There were two aspects to the
controversy, one involving the legal authority for permitting an operating
subsidiary of a national bank greater powers than the bank itself and the
second amounting to a political controversy over whether operating
subsidiaries of national banks should be permitted to engage in the same
lines of business as holding company affiliates.
i.

The Legal Authority Issue

Adoption of the new Part 5 regulations, including Section 5.34(£),
was supported by a legal opinion prepared by the chief legal counsel of the
OCC.135 Given the traditional view of bank operating subsidiaries, writing
such a legal opinion was a difficult task. The legal arguments advanced to
support the OCC's position were weak in some key areas and the opinion
failed completely to address certain prickly legal issues. One was left with
the impression that the acc was on shaky legal ground. The line of
argument in the opinion consisted of two main points. First, national banks
had the legal right to own subsidiaries through which they could conduct
their business. Second, an operating subsidiary could be permitted to
engage in banking activities or activities incidental thereto that would be
prohibited to the parent bank if the rationale for the prohibition does not
apply to the subsidiary and a Congressional purpose would not be frustrated.
The legal opinion suffered from two major defects. One was that the
first strand of the argument was based on implied banking powers and not on
the specific grant of authority in a statute. With respect to the second strand
133
134

See id.
See 61 Fed. Reg. 60342, 60350 (1996). The OCC noted that commenters

opposing such rules included several trade associations that generally questioned
bank entry into certain lines of business.
135 See Memorandum dated November 18, 1996 of Julie L. Williams, Chief
Counsel, to Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, RE: Legal Authority
for Revised Operating Subsidiary Regulation (visited April 11, 1999)
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/part5.htm>
[hereinafter
OCC
Legal
Memorandum].
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of the argument, the opinion failed to advance convincing legal arguments
for why a structure long regarded by the acc itself as nothing more than a
"department" of a bank should be permitted to engage in novel activities that
the bank itself cannot engage in as a matter of law.
The acc's counsel made several points to support the contention
that banks have the legal authority to own shares of operating subsidiaries
through which they conduct their business. The legal authority of national
banks to own subsidiaries and to conduct business through them is based on
the general authority given national banks in 12 U.S.C. Section 24 (Seventh)
to exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary" to engage in
According to the acc counsel's
the business of banking.136
interpretation,137 activities that are either part of or incidental to the business
of banking fall into one of two broad categories: I) those that involve
"banking" activities or activities "incidental" to the delivery of banking
products or services,138 and 2) those that are incidental to conducting a
banking business even though they are not banking activities or incidental to
the delivery of a banking product or service.139 The power of a national
bank to own a subsidiary and to conduct business through such an entity falls
within the authority of this second category. The acc counsel conceded
that owning subsidiary companies is not part of the business of banking, but
then argued it is a lawful activity for a bank because it constitutes part of
what the bank must do to remain in business. 140 This is a weak argument
because it is not something that banks are required to do in order to stay in
136 See 12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh) (1999). The term "necessary" has been construed
to mean "convenient and useful." Arnold Tours v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st
Cir. 1972).
137 See OCC Legal Memorandum, supra note 135, at 2-3.
138 An example was the OCC's determination that the automobile leasing activities
of a national bank were permissible because they were similar to secured lending,
which is expressly permitted by 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). This determination was
upheld in M&M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat 'I Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
139 An example is the authority of a national bank to borrow, which is not
enumerated in Section 24 (Seventh) but has been upheld by the federal courts as a
permissible activity on the grounds that it is an incident to the conduct of a banking
business. See Wyman v. Wallace, 201 U.S. 230 (1905); Aldrich v. Chemical Nat'!
Bank, 176 U.S. 618 (1900); Auten v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 125 (1899).
140 See OCC Legal Memorandum, supra note 135, at 3. The OCC counsel would
draw the line regarding the types of activities a subsidiary may engage in at activities
that are part of or incidental to the conduct of the banking business.
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business. It is possible to conduct a banking business without the use of
operating subsidiaries. A better argument is that the practice of bank
ownership of operating subsidiaries is now well-established and that, in the
absence of a Congressional or regulatory prohibition on further use of such
subsidiaries, banks should be allowed to take advantage of the ordinary
incidents ofthe corporate form, namely operating through a subsidiary.
In addition, the acc counsel stated that amendments to Section 24
(Seventh) effected by the McFadden Act of 1927 and the Banking Act of
1933 did not limit the power of national banks to own shares of subsidiary
corporations, as some commentators have argued, but rather were directed
only at limiting involvement in investment banking activities. 141 In fact, she
argued, these amendments, in seeking to regulate national bank involvement
in securities activities, served to confirm that banks had the authority to own
stock. 142 Another argument advanced by the acc counsel was that since
1933, Congress, the courts, and the acc have consistently recognized that
national banks can conduct their business either directly or through operating
subsidiaries. 143
The acc counsel failed to address the existence of the Bank Service
Company Act ("BSCA"),144 in which Congress granted banks the authority
to own subsidiaries l45 that may engage in a wide range of nonbanking
activities. 146 There are several types of bank service companies authorized
by the BSCA. ane type may engage in clerical, bookkeeping, accounting,
and statistical functions performed for a depository institution. 147 A second
type of service company may, upon application to the relevant federal
banking regulator, conduct other activities, except for deposit-taking, that are
permitted to national or state banks that own such companies. 148 A third
type may engage in any activity that the Board has determined to be
permissible for a bank holding company, other than deposit taking,l49 The
existence of this legislation undermines the acc counsel's argument for
See id. at 3-9.
See id. at 9-11.
143 See id. at 11-14.
144 See 12 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1999).
145 See 12 U.S.C. § 1862 (1999). The BSCA contains limitations on the amount of
the investment an insured bank may make in such a subsidiary.
146 See MALLOY, BANK REGULATION, supra note 17, at 163-166.
147 See 12 U.S.C. § 1863 (I 999).
148 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1864, 1865 (1999).
149 See 12 U.S.c. §§ 1864(f), 1865(b) (1999).
141

142
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authority of national banks to own operating subsidiaries based on implied
power. It suggests that if Congress were able to take action to explicitly
permit bank service companies by statute, it could have done the same thing
with respect to operating subsidiaries. In view of the BSCA, the absence of
such statutory authority for operating subsidiaries may indicate that banks do
not in fact have implied power to own shares of operating subsidiaries.
Another issue that is raised by the existence of the BSCA relates to the
restriction on powers to those permitted to the bank shareholders of the
subsidiaries. It seems unlikely that Congress would have intended that the
implied powers of an operating subsidiary could extend beyond those
permissible for their parent banks when the activities of a bank service
company are explicitly limited to the powers exercisable by the parent
bank(s). The acc counsel's opinion did not even raise, much less answer
this question.
The second part of the legal authority argument was directed toward
addressing when an operating subsidiary could engage in banking or
incidental-to-banking activities that its parent bank could not engage in. The
acc counsel's opinion took the position that the operating subsidiary could
be deemed to have broader powers than the national bank when the rationale
for the prohibition does not apply to the subsidiary, and conduct by the
subsidiary of such activity would not frustrate a Congressional purpose or
prevent its parent from conducting the activity. In addressing the issue, the
OCC would do so on a case-by-case basis and would consider the following
factors with respect to a particular activity: 1) the form and specificity of the
restriction applicable to the parent bank; 2) why the restriction applied to the
parent bank; and 3) whether it would frustrate the purpose underlying the
restriction on the parent bank to permit a subsidiary of the bank to engage in
the particular activity.I 50 In addition, the acc announced that it would also
consider the safety and soundness implications of the activity, other
regulatory safeguards applying to the subsidiary or the activity itself,
conditions imposed by the acc in conjunction with application approval,
and any additional undertakings by the bank or its operating subsidiary to
address these factors. 151
The legal basis for acc approval of broader activities for operating
subsidiaries of national banks than for national banks themselves was weak
on its face. First, there was no reference to express statutory authorization
ISO See DCC, Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 60,341, 60,352 (1996).
lSI See id.
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for operating subsidiaries to engage in lines of business other than those
permitted to national banks. Second, the oee seemed to be relying in part
on its own interpretation of operating subsidiary powers to justify its
position, stating that the basis for such broader powers for operating
subsidiaries was the fact that the oee, other Federal banking regulators and
the courts had determined that limitations applicable to a national bank do
not necessarily apply to its affiliates, including its operating subsidiaries.
With respect to oee practice, the agency traditionally has taken the position
that federal banking laws applicable to a national bank should also be
applied to the operations of a subsidiary, but it has made exceptions allowing
operating subsidiaries to engage in broader activities. This happened on only
a few occasions, however, in which the oee granted permission for
operating subsidiaries to act as a general partner in a partnership and other
business ventures,152 even though the Supreme Court has held that it is ultra
vires for a national bank to act in such capacity due to the risk of unlimited
liability that a general partner assumes. 153 In these instances, the oee
recognized that the separate incorporation of the operating subsidiary should
protect the national bank from the risk of unlimited liability flowing through
to it. 154 In some cases, the oee required that the bank take additional steps
to protect itself, such as ensuring that the subsidiary is adequately
capitalized, insulating the bank from the partnership in various ways
intended to maintain separation of the two entities, and limiting
commitments by the bank and its affiliates to the partnership.
In light of the expansive scope of the Operating Subsidiary Rule, the
oee had the burden of explaining away its earlier, more restrictive attitude
towards bank operating subsidiaries. 155 The oee did not formally authorize
use of bank operating subsidiaries until 1966 and for many years took the
position that such subsidiaries were "separately incorporated departments" of
152 Examples of such acc approvals include OCC Interpretive Letter No. 289
(May 15, 1984) (bank operating subsidiary may act as a general partner with another
bank to establish an automated teller machine network) and OCC Interpretive Letter
No. 423 (April 11, 1988) (bank operating subsidiary may become the managing
general partner of a Delaware limited partnership engaged in real estate mortgage
loan investments).
153 See Merchants Nat'} Bank v. Wehrmann, 202 U.S. 295,301 (1906). The bank
had taken the partnership interest as security for a debt and afterwards become
owner of such interest in satisfaction of the debt.
154 See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 289, supra note 152.
155 See Acquisition of Controlling Stock Interest in Subsidiary Operations
Corporation, 31 Fed. Reg. 11,459 (1966) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)).
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the bank. The implication was that such subsidiaries had the same powers,
but not greater powers than the bank itself.156 The OCC counsel took the
position that this was not a binding legal characterization of the outer limits
of operating subsidiary activities, but rather an indication of what the OCC
was prepared to allow at that point in time. 157 The OCC decided to take a
more liberal view of permissible activities for operating subsidiaries in the
Operating Subsidiary Rule than its earlier stated position indicated it would,
but without any express or implied statutory basis for doing so. The
argument seemed to be that the OCC may determine in its discretion the
limits of bank operating subsidiary powers based on its own determination
that a statutory prohibition applicable to the parent bank should not apply to
the bank's subsidiary on policy grounds. This is a very aggressive use of
administrative agency discretion in the absence of an express or implied
statutory basis for subsidiary powers that are greater than those of the parent.
If this is indeed the argument, it seems to offend commonly understood
notions of the role of administrative agencies in interpreting statutes.
As additional support for her position, the OCC legal counsel cited
both OCC and federal court precedent permitting geographic expansion in
the case of an operating subsidiary that would be prohibited for the national
bank. 158 This precedent seems inapposite to the question at hand for it
concerns geographic restrictions and not activities restrictions, which are
governed by a different regulatory scheme and driven by different policy
considerations. Finally, the OCC cited decisions of the Supreme Court and
several federal courts upholding Board orders or regulations approving
securities-related activities of holding company affiliates that a bank itself
could not conduct. 159 Again, the precedent cited does not directly support
the OCC's position, because the power of a nonbank subsidiary of a holding
company to engage in broader activities than a bank subsidiary itself may
conduct is supported by Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act.
There was no such express statutory authority in the case of bank operating
subsidiaries prior to passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.

156 See The OCC described the operating subsidiary as "a corporation the function
or functions of which are limited to one or several of the functions or activities that a
national bank is authorized to carry on." Id. at 11,460.
157 See OCC Legal Memorandum, supra note 135, at 18.
158 See id. at 17-18.
159 See id. at 16.
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The Political Controversy

The Operating Subsidiary Rule raised the possibility that operating
subsidiaries of national banks would be pennitted to conduct the same types
of activities as affiliates of bank holding companies, including Section 20
securities subsidiaries. 160 In the case of the NationsBank application under
the Operating Subsidiary Rule relating to real estate development activities,
which is discussed below, the possibility was raised that operating
subsidiaries might even be allowed to engage in a wider range of activities
than holding company affiliates. This provoked the Board to publicly
In addition, the Board filed
criticize the Operating Subsidiary Rule.I 61
comments in opposition in response to Federal Register notices on the first
two applications under the Operating Subsidiary Rule filed by Zions Bank
and NationsBank, which are discussed below. 162 These comments, viewed
as a whole, indicated that there was more at stake in the debate over the
Operating Subsidiary Rule than questions regarding the legal basis for the

See Ludwig, supra note 122
161 Chainnan Alan Greenspan noted in Congressional testimony that "[t]he bank
subsidiary may be a marginally more efficient way of delivering [expanded
financial] services, but we believe it cannot avoid being a funnel for transferring the
sovereign credit subsidy directly from the bank to finance the new powers, thereby
imparting a subsidized competitive advantage to the subsidiary of the bank."
Hearings on Financiai Restructuring Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services,
105th Congo (1997). He also stated that the operating subsidiary rule, coupled with
provisions of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994, makes it inherently more cumbersome for state banks to participate in
interstate branching and threatens the dual banking system and the viability of state
banks. He said he feared the advantages enjoyed by national banks might coax many
state banks into switching charters. See id. The objections raised by the Federal
Reserve will be further discussed infra in Part III.
162 The comments of the Board on the Zions Bank application underscored the
Board's fundamental opposition to the operating subsidiary as a vehicle for
expansion of banking activities. Letter dated May 19, 1997 of the Board, to Eugene
A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency (on file with the author). The Board
expressed serious doubts that Congress created a statutory scheme that would allow
express prohibitions on the activities of national banks to be overridden by
administrative interpretation and thought the OCC should deny any application to
allow a national bank to engage through a subsidiary in an activity that is not
pennissible for a national bank to conduct directly.
160
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new rules or even safety and soundness considerations. 163 The Board's
remarks raised fundamental policy questions regarding the proper allocation
of regulatory authority within the federal government. Some commentators
suggested that because an operating subsidiary could conceivably conduct
any activity that is financial in nature under the Operating Subsidiary Rule,
the Board feared that the operating subsidiary might replace the bank
holding company, which is regulated by the Board, as the preferred vehicle
for expansion of activities by bank affiliates, which in tum would adversely
affect the Board's preeminent role in banking regulation.l 64

c.

OCC Approvals Under the Operating Subsidiary Rule

As had been predicted by commentators even before the Operating
Subsidiary Rule was adopted, the OCC granted approvals permitting national
bank operating subsidiaries to underwrite and deal in bank ineligible
securities soon after the rule became effective. An application to engage in
real estate development and real estate lease financing was filed but was not
acted upon.l 65
i.

Revenue Bond Underwriting and Dealing

The first application approved under the Operating Subsidiary Rule
was submitted by Zions First National Bank of Salt Lake City, Utah,
("Zions").166 The application sought authority for Zions Investment

163 Chainnan Alan Greenspan has stated in Congressional testimony that safety and
soundness issues are not raised by use of the operating subsidiary. See Financial
Services Restructuring: Hearings Before the House ofRepresentatives Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, 105th Congo (1997) (statement of Chainnan
Greenspan) (stating in relevant part as follows: " ... my concerns are not safety and
soundness. It is the issue of creating subsidies for individual institutions which their
competitors do not have. It is a level playing field issue.")
164 See Fed Opposes Zions Op-sub Proposals on Revenue Bonds. 16 BANKING
POL'y REp. 2 (1997).
165 This infonnation is based on a search of the OCC Website (visited Apr. 11,
1999) <http://www.occ.treas.gov> and was confinned in a telephone conversation
with a staff attorney of the OCC Securities and Corporate Practices Division on Apr.
5, 1999.
166 See Letter dated April 8, 1997 of W. David Hemingway, Executive Vice
President, Zions First National Bank to Ellen Shepherd, Acting Licensing Manager,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Western District, available in (visited
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Securities Inc. ("Zions Investment"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Zions, to
underwrite, deal in, and invest in securities of states and their political
subdivisions, including both general obligation bonds and revenue bonds
considered bank ineligible securities under Section 16 of Glass-Steagall.
The Zions Application undertook that Zions Investment would not be
engaged principally in underwriting and dealing activities and stated that its
revenue to be derived from such activity would be limited to 25% of its total
revenues. 167 The OCC approved the application after having concluded that
the proposed activities were legally authorized and consistent with safe and
sound banking practices. 168

a.

Legal Authorization

The basis for the Comptroller's decision was a determination that
underwriting and dealing in revenue bonds was permissible for subsidiaries
of national banks because such activities are authorized under Section 24
(Seventh) of the National Bank Act and as proposed to be conducted would
be allowed under Section 20 of Glass-Steagall. 169 Some ofthe arguments in
the Zions Approval closely resemble those advanced by the Board in its
Section 20 orders, and in fact these are the strongest arguments made. Other
Apr.
10,
1999)
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/regsizionsapp.pdf>
and
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/regs/zionsmem.pdf> [hereinafter Zions Application].
167 Zions Investment was already engaged in the business of providing brokerage
and investment advisory services relating to securities and investment products,
including corporate equity securities, U.S. government securities, annuities and other
securities, was registered as a broker-dealer with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and was a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers.
Zions had engaged for many years in underwriting and dealing in general obligation
securities, certain revenue bonds considered eligible for banks to underwrite and
deal in, such as bonds for housing, university or dormitory purposes (bank eligible
securities), and U.S. government and agency securities. Zions planned to act as
clearing agent for, and as broker and investment adviser regarding, securities
underwritten by Zions Investment after making full disclosure to customers. See
Zions Application, supra note 166, at 3-4.
168 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Conditional Approval #262,
Application by Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah, to Commerce New
Activities in an Operating Subsidiary (Engage in Underwriting, Dealing in, and
Investing in Securities of States and Their Political Subdivisions) (December 11,
1997),
available
in
(visited
Apr.
10,
1999)
<http.:/lwww.occ.treas.gov/releaselzionsdec.pdf>[hereinafterZionsApproval].at 3

4.
169

See id. at 5-6.
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arguments parallel those made in the oee counsel's opinion supporting the
Operating Subsidiary Rule and suffer from the same defects discussed
earlier.
First, the power to underwrite and deal in debt securities like
the municipal revenue bonds in question was an enumerated power under
Section 24 (Seventh), 170 or in the alternative, such activity constituted part of
the general business of banking because ofthe financial nature of the activity
and the relationship to other traditional banking functions. 171 This closely
resembles the Board's argument in the Section 20 orders that underwriting
and dealing in bank ineligible securities was appropriate for a holding
company affiliate under Section 1843(c)(8) because it was "closely related to
banking." 172
Second, national banks are empowered to own operating subsidiaries
as an incident to their banking activities. This argument was made in the
legal opinion supporting the Operating Subsidiary Rule and did not improve
with age.
Third, a national bank operating subsidiary may engage in securities
underwriting and dealing activities on the authority of Section 20 of Glass
Steagall. That section, which prohibited national banks from affiliations
with corporations "engaged principally" in securities underwriting or
dealing, was interpreted by the Board in the Section 20 orders to permit non
bank affiliates of banks in a holding company structure to engage in
underwriting and dealing in bank ineligible securities on a limited basis on
the theory that such an affiliate would not be deemed to be engaged
principally in the activities prohibited by Section 20. This interpretation has
been upheld by the federal courts. )73 The oee took up this line of reasoning
in the Zions Approval and refined it further. In the oee's view, an
operating subsidiary of a national bank may be deemed to be an affiliate for

)70

See id at 9.

The acc argued that such underwriting and dealing was a
functional equivalent of other activities conducted by national banks as a financial
intermediary and is similar to securities activities of nationa1 banks involving bank
eligible activities on the authority of Section 16 of Glass-Steagall; such activity
would produce benefits to local governments and taxpayers and increase bank
revenues; and the risks in underwriting and dealing with revenue bonds is no greater
than associated with underwriting and dealing in bank eligible securities and
investing in revenue bonds. See id.
172 See id.
)73 See supra Section II.B.I.
17) See id. at 9-14.
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purposes of Section 20. 174 Therefore, an operating subsidiary should be able
to underwrite and deal in securities of the type not permitted for its parent, as
long as it is not "engaged principally" in such activities. 175 Employing the
Board's recent reinterpretation of the expression "engaged principally," this
meant that an operating subsidiary like Zions Investment that would limit the
revenue derived from underwriting and dealing in bank ineligible revenue
bonds to no more than 25% of total revenues would not be deemed to violate
Section 20 of Glass-Steagall.
Fourth, national banks are authorized to own operating subsidiaries
engaged in activities not permissible for the bank to engage in directly,176
This argument was made in the legal opinion supporting the Operating
Subsidiary Rule and was not refined further. It was perhaps the weakest link
in the chain of argument in the Zions Approval. l77

b.

Consistency with Safe and Sound Banking Practice

This portion of the Comptroller's decision was based on its
conclusion that the proposed activities would be conducted in a manner that
would present limited risk to the bank and its operating subsidiary and would
be conducted in a safe and sound manner,178 First, the proposed activities
represented only an incremental expansion of the municipal securities
activities already conducted by national banks generally and by Zions in

174 See 12 U.S.C. § 221.a(b)(I).(1998). This interpretation is based upon the
applicable definition of affiliate, which includes "a corporation . . . of which a
member bank directly or indirectly owns or controls a majority of the voting shares
or more than 50% of the number of shares voted for the election of directors ... "
[d. Since operating subsidiary is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2) to include entities
in which the parent bank "owns more than 50% of the voting (or similar type of
controlling) interest of the subsidiary; or the parent bank otherwise controls the
subsidiary and no other party controls more than 50% of the voting (or similar type
of controlling) interest of the subsidiary . . . ," the OCC argued that, applying the
literal language of the statute, an operating subsidiary is an "affiliate" for purposes
of Section 20 of Glass-Steagall. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2)(1999), Zions Approval,
supra note 168, at 19.
175 See id. at 19.
176 See id. at 20.
177 See id. at 20-23.
178 See id. at 24.
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particular. 179 Second, the OCC emphasized the corporate separateness of the
operating subsidiary, noting that any potential risk associated with the new
activities would not negatively affect the bank, because it would be insulated
both structuraJly and operationally from the operating subsidiary as a result
of the corporate separateness requirements of the Operating Subsidiary
Rule. 180 Third, the OCC relied on the comprehensive supervision and
functional regulation by securities regulatory authorities and the role of the
OCC in ensuring that the bank comply with safety and soundness regulations
and conditions imposed under the Operating Subsidiary Rule and the
conditional approval. lSI Fourth, the OCC cited the safety and soundness
conditions and safeguards on the bank and the operating subsidiary pursuant
to the Operating Subsidiary Rule, which were intended to contain risk,
reduce potential conflicts of interest, and ensure the safe and sound operation
of both entities, and the additional conditions applicable under the
conditional approval. 182 Several of these conditions were patterned after the
new operating standards fashioned by the Board for Section 20 subsidiaries
and were tailored to address the risks of affiliation with an insured bank that
are not adequately dealt with through banking laws. IS3

179 The fact that Zions was a primary dealer in government securities was viewed as
a factor mitigating risk. The acc was persuaded by conversations with other
regulators, namely the National Association of Securities Dealers, Regulation, Inc.,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Board and the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York regarding their supervision of Section 20 subsidiaries that there were
no unique compliance or supervisory problems relating to underwriting and dealing
in revenue bonds through such subsidiaries. The acc cited the statement of a
former chairman of the FDIC that there have not been many problems associated
with bona fide securities subsidiaries of insured nonmember state banks under FDIC
supervision. See id
ISO See id at 25-26.
181 See id. at 26-27.
182 See id. at 27-28. These conditions included internal controls of the bank
governing participation in transactions underwritten or arranged by the subsidiary,
compliance of intra-day credit extensions by the bank to the subsidiary with the
terms of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, a prohibition on bank lending to
customers for the purpose of buying securities underwritten by the subsidiary during
the underwriting period, the requirement of disclosures mandated under the Retail
Sales Statement (see supra note 102) to avoid customer confusion, and a prohibition
on bank employee recommendations of securities underwritten by the subsidiary
without disclosure of the subsidiary's underwriter status.
183 See 62 Fed. Reg. 45295, 45296 (1997); 12 C.F.R. § 225.200 (1999).
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In addition to the Zions Approval, the OCC approved other
applications under the Operating Subsidiary Rule to engage in revenue bond
underwriting and dealing. 184 The activities to be undertaken were the same
as those approved in the Zions Approval, and the banks and their operating
subsidiaries were subject to the same conditions. 185 In these approvals, the
OCC adopted virtually identical standards as the Board adopted in its Section
20 orders for securities underwriting by bank affiliates. Both regulators
adopted a policy of permitting limited underwriting and dealing in bank
ineligible securities. Both used a 25% revenue test as the qualifying standard
and required that the bank affiliate comply with regulatory firewalls. Many
of the safeguards adopted in the OCC approvals are identical to the operating
standards adopted by the Board to replace the firewalls previously applicable
to Section 20 subsidiaries. One could conclude that the OCC followed the
lead of the Board in order to foreclose the argument that use of an operating
subsidiary raised safety and soundness concerns or the potential for conflict
of interest transactions that might be damaging to banks.
ii.

Real Estate Development

NationsBank of Charlotte, North Carolina filed an application under
the Operating Subsidiary Rule seeking authority to conduct real estate
The NationsBank proposal was more
development activities.l 86

184 See OCC Corporate Decision 98-48 (Oct. 20, \998) (National Bank of
Commerce of Memphis, Tennessee); OCC Conditional Approval No. 297 (Dec. 9,
1998) (OMB Bank of Kansas City, Missouri; and OCC Conditional Approval No.
309 (Apr. 12, 1999) (First Tennessee).
185 See id.
186 Letter of Richard K. Kim, Assistant General Counsel, NationsBank Corporation
to Mr. Steven 1. Weiss, Deputy Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, (March 26, 1997) available in (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/regsltryonap.pdf>
[hereinafter
N ationsBank
Application]. The real estate development subsidiary, Tryon Development Partners,
was to be organized as a corporation or other form of limited liability company with
NationsBank as the sole shareholder. It planned to develop real estate in locations
that NationsBank already occupied for bank premises. Its immediate plan was to
build residential condominium units adjacent to an office building that had been
owned by the bank for 25 years and was the site of a bank branch. The bank also
anticipated that the operating subsidiary would engage in the future in further real
estate development in the areas adjacent to or near the bank premises but planned to
request prior approval from the OCC before commencing such activities. See id. at
1-2.
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controversial than the Zions Application because national banks are
effectively precluded from real estate development activities due to the
general prohibition on ownership of real estate contained in Section 29 of
the National Bank Act. 187 In addition, real estate development activities are
not permissible for bank holding company affiliates pursuant to Board
Regulation y'188 Although this application was filed prior to the Zions
Application, it was not acted upon, no doubt due to its controversial nature.

III.

THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE ISSUE IN THE GRAMM
LEACH-BLILEY ACT
A.

The Compromise Position of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
and Its Legislative History

Gramm-Leach-Bliley was signed into law by President Clinton on
November 12,1999, after having passed the Senate and House on November
4, 1999.1 89 It expanded the universe of financial activities permissible to
banks and their affiliates by partially repealing Glass-Steagall and amending
the Bank Holding Company Act.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley reflects a
compromise on the corporate structure issue that is somewhere between the
two polar viewpoints in the debate. Before detailing the outcome, the

187 12 U.S.C. § 29 prohibits banks from acquiring or holding real estate unless such
real estate is used in the transaction of its business or was taken as security in
connection with debt owed to the bank. See 12 U.S.C. §29 (1999).
188 See 12 C.F.R. Part 225 (1999).
189 Separate financial modernization bills were passed by each house of Congress
within the first six months of the opening of the 106th Congress. The Senate passed
S. 900, the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, by a vote of 54-44 on
May 6, 1999 and the House of Representatives passed H.R. 10, the Financial
Services Act of 1999, by a vote of 343-86 on July 1, 1999. The bills were referred
to a conference committee, which began meeting on August 3, 1999 and concluded
its work on October 12, 1999. A conference report dated November 1, 1999 was
signed by the majority of the conferees on November 2, 1999. On November 4,
1999, Gramm-Leach-Bliley passed the Senate by a vote of 90-8 and the House by a
vote of362-57. Senate Banking Committee Press Release, November 5, 1999, Time
Line of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, available in (visited Jan. 25, 2000)
<http://www.senate.gov/~bankinglpreI9911105tme.htm> . The conference report is
available
in
(visited
Nov.
29,
1999)
http://www.senate.gov/~bankingiconf/somfinaI.htm.
The text of Gramm-Leach
Biliey is available in (visited Nov. 29, 1999) http://www.gov/-banking/conf/.
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legislative history will be discussed in order to better understand the
compromise that was reached.
Early versions of financial modernization legislation introduced in
Congress over the past two decades proposed liberalizing bank activities
restrictions but required new financial activities to be conducted exclusively
through a holding company affiliate, essentially adopting the position of the
Board. The operating subsidiary option was included in later bills in large
part due to Treasury Department efforts. The Treasury Department's
proposal on the corporate structure issue, detailed in a report on financial
modernization legislation prepared for Congress on behalf of the Clinton
administration in 1997 ("Treasury Department Modernization Proposal"),
would have permitted operating subsidiaries of national banks to engage in
the same activities as bank holding company affiliates subject to the same
Throughout the debate over financial
affiliate transaction rules. 190
modernization legislation in both the 105 th and 106th Congresses, the
Clinton administration remained steadfast in its view that financial
modernization required equivalent treatment of bank operating subsidiaries
and bank holding company affiliates and threatened to veto legislation that
did not meet this standard. 191
190 Department of the Treasury, News Release, Treasury Provides Blueprint for
Financial Modernization (May 21, 1997), available in 1997 WL 272500. Financial
Services Restructuring, Hearings on Financial Modernization Before the House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105 th Congo (1997) (testimony of
Robert E. Rubin, Secretary at the Treasury) (testimony of Jerry Hawke, Treasury
Under Secretary For Domestic Finance). First, bank holding companies meeting
certain criteria and subject to certain safeguards would be permitted to engage in the
full range of financial activities, including securities brokerage, underwriting, and
dealing; insurance brokerage and underwriting; mutual fund sponsorship; investment
advisory services; and merchant banking. Second, national banks would be
permitted to conduct any financial activity through subsidiaries, other than real
estate development. National banks would be permitted to engage directly in any
activity previously approved for national banks or federally chartered thrifts, except
for real estate development. National banks would also be permitted to act as
general agents for the sale of insurance, would be prohibited from engaging in any
insurance underwriting activity other than what was then currently permissible (e.g.
underwriting of credit-related insurance), and would be permitted to underwrite and
deal in municipal revenue bonds in addition to other securities activities currently
permissible for such banks.
191 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, HR. 10
The Financial Services Act of 1999,
Working Summary No.2, at 3 (April 28, 1999) [hereinafter Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher 1999].

2000J

STRUCTURING THE FINANCIAL SERVICE CONGLOMERATES

383

Gramm-Leach-Bliley had its origins in comprehensive bank reform
legislation introduced in the losth Congress as H.R. 10, the Financial
Services Act of 1998 ("1998 Version of H.R. 10").192 Although that bill
envisioned sweeping changes in federal law that would permit affiliations
between banks and other financial service firms,193 the bill restricted bank
operating subsidiaries' activities to those that could be conducted by the
bank itself. 194
It therefore fell short of the treatment of operating
subsidiaries advocated in the Treasury Department Modernization Proposal.
Although H.R. 10 passed the full House and was approved with amendments
by the Senate Banking Committee,195 it failed to be considered by the full
Senate due to disagreements over several key issues, including the status of
operating subsidiaries, which triggered the threat of a presidential veto. 196
Financial modernization legislation was reintroduced in the House at
the beginning of the 106th Congress as H.R.1 0, the Financial Services Act of
1999. 197 Congressman James Leach, Chairman of the House Banking
Committee, indicated that the purpose behind the legislation was "to level
the competitive playing field within the financial services industry, to
increase competition so that costs of services will go down for customers and
to boost the international competitive position of American firms."198 He

192 See H.R. Rep. No. 531 (I998), available in 1998 WL 239626 (reprinting the
text of H.R. 10 that was referred out of the House Rules Committee and passed the
House on May 13, 1998 by a vote of214-213).
193 The 1998 Version ofH.R. 10 contemplated the repeal of Sections 20 and 32 of
Glass-Steagall, among other changes. See id.
194 SeeH.R. 10, 105 th Cong. §121 (1998).
195 An amended version of H.R. 10 passed the Senate Banking Committee by a
vote of 16-2 on September 11, 1998.
196 See 15 Bank Policy Rep. Veto Threat Stalls Financial Modernization
Legislation (Oct. 13, 1998). Another cause was the threat by Senator Phil Gramm
CR-Texas) to filibuster over a perceived increase in bank responsibilities under the
Community Reinvestment Act. See id. The chair of the House Banking and
Financial Services Committee, James A. Leach, introduced a revised version ofH.R.
10 entitled H.R. 4870 at the end of the session as a bridge to the 106 th Congress. See
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, H.R. 10 - The Financial Services Act of 1998. at 1 (Dec.
21, 1998) (on file with the author).
197 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo (1999) introduced January 6, 1999 by Rep. Leach.
198 Modernization Bill. CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASES (Jan. 6, 1999).
Congressman Leach also stated that "an important by-product of this legislation will
be to provide consumers and smaller businesses in more rural states with access to a

384

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

VOL. 19: 329

also stated that financial services modernization would be a top priority of
the House Banking Committee in the 106th Congress,199 reflecting a
growing consensus that reform of activities restrictions was urgently needed
in order for U.S. financial firms to be able to innovate and to compete
globally. 200
As reintroduced, H.R. 10 contained provisions granting expansive
powers for affiliates of bank holding companies, but restricting operating
subsidiaries of national banks to financial agency activities. 201 As in the
case of the 1998 Version ofH.R. 10, the Clinton administration threatened to
veto the bill if it contained such limitations on operating subsidiaries. 202
After referral to the House Banking and Commerce Committees, the bill was
amended to include provisions on operating subsidiaries, among other
wider variety of financial products by empowering local institutions to offer a full
range of products and services." Id
199 See House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Financial Services,
Press Release (Jan. 6, 1999), available in (visited May 7, 1999)
<http://www.house.gov/bankingI16991pr.htm> .
200 Members of banking industry groups and executives of financial services finns
made this point on a number of occasions in commenting on the proposed
legislation. For example, the chief legislative council of the American Bankers
Association noted that American banks dominate globally but if laws are not
changed, "U.S. financial institutions will be placed at a growing disadvantage."
Investment Banks See the Future in Full-Service Arena. NATIONAL POST, Jan. 10,
1999, at CIO. Merrill Lynch Chainnan David H. Komansky noted that "we're now
the only developed country in the world that hasn't lifted the barriers separating
commercial banking, securities and insurance. Decisions made in Washington in the
weeks and months ahead will playa key role in detennining America's position in
this new global financial marketplace." Merrill Lynch Chairman Calls for Financial
Services Regulatory Reform. U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 15, 1999. The Council of
Economic Advisers reported to the President in 1983 that Glass-Steagall "now
makes no important contribution to the protection of the public against bank failures
or undue concentrations of economic power. EcON. REp. OF THE PRESIDENT, 1983
ANN. REp. OF COUNCIL OF EcON. ADVISORS, H.R., DOC No. 98-2, AT 122 (1983).
Chainnan Greenspan, testifying in front of the Senate Banking Committee on H.R.
lOin 1998, stated that refonn legislation was necessary to ensure the continued
competitiveness of U.S. fmancial institutions and to enable such institutions to
continue to innovate, operate efficiently and provide the best possible services to
consumers. Hearings on HR. 10 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 105 th Congo (1998). (testimony of Alan Greenspan).
20 I See January 6, 1999 Press Release, supra note 199.
202 See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher - 1999, supra note 191, at 47.
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changes,203 and was eventually passed by the full House ("1999 Version of
H.R. 10").204 The 1999 Version of H.R. 10 permitted the establishment of a
new type of banking holding company called a "financial holding company,"
which would be allowed to engage in new financial activities,205 and also
permitted national banks to engage in certain of those activities through use
of operating subsidiaries called "financial subsidiaries."206
Permitted
financial activities for financial holding companies were those set forth in the
bill and those determined by the Board, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury, to be financial in nature, incidental thereto, or complementary
to authorized activities. 207 Permitted financial activities for financial
subsidiaries were those authorized for financial holding companies and those
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Board,
to be financial in nature or incidental thereto.208 Financial activities that
were expressly permitted included securities and insurance underwriting and
merchant banking activities. 209 However, certain activities were expressly
prohibited for operating subsidiaries, namely insurance underwriting (other
than credit insurance), issuing annuities, engaging in real estate investment
or development, and investing in insurance companies. 210 Operating
subsidiaries were prohibited from engaging in other activities that exceeded
national bank powers, except to the extent expressly provided by other
federal statutes, including the BSCA and Sections 25 and 25A of the Federal
Reserve Act relating to the establishment of Edge Act subsidiaries. 211 In
203 The House Banking Committee reported an amended version of H.R. lOon
March 23, 1999, which reflected a compromise reached with the ranking Democrat
on the House Banking Committee, Representative John LaFalce, by including a
broader operating subsidiary provision. House of Representatives, Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, Press Release, March II, 1999 available in (visited
May 7, 1999) <http://www.house.govlbanking/1699Ipr.htm>. The House
Commerce Committee reported an amended version of the bill on June 15, 1999.
H.R. 10, Bill Summary and Status, available in (visited Oct. II, 1999)
http://thomas.loc.gov .
204 See H.R. 10, version dated July 12, 1999, available in (visited Oct. II, 1999)
<http://www .house.gov/banking/hrashp. pdf>.
205 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §103(a) (1999).
206 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §121(a) (1999).
207 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §103(a)(1999).
208 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §121(a) (1999).
209 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §103(a)(1999).
210 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §121(a) (1999).
211 See id.
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order to become a financial holding company, all subsidiary depository
institutions were required to be well-capitalized, well-managed, have a
Community Reinvestment Act rating of satisfactory or better, and the
holding company must have filed a declaration with the Board. 212 In order
for a national bank to establish a financial subsidiary, the bank and all its
depository institution affiliates were required to be well-capitalized, well
managed, and have a Community Reinvestment Act rating of satisfactory or
better, and the bank must have received the approval of the Comptroller. 213
Only smaller national banks were allowed to establish financial subsidiaries
outside of a holding company framework. A national bank with assets of
$10 billion or more was permitted to establish a financial subsidiary only if
such bank were owned by a bank holding company.214 Firewalls intended to
promote safety and soundness considerations were made applicable to banks
and their financial subsidiaries and also to transactions between financial
subsidiaries and other affiliates. 2lS These included: limitations on the equity
investment of a bank in a financial subsidiary,216 maintenance of procedures
for identifying and managing financial and operational risks posed by the
financial subsidiary, maintenance of separate corporate status for the
financial subsidiary, and application of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act to transactions between a financial subsidiary and a bank. 217
Financial modernization legislation was introduced in the Senate at
the beginning of the 106th Congress as S.900, the Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999.218 After referral out of the Senate Banking

See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §103(a) (1999).
213 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §12l(a) (1999).
214 See id.
215 SeeH.R. 10, 106th Cong. §122 (l999).
216 Such limitations included deducting equity investments in financial subsidiaries
from the assets and tangible equity of the bank, prohibiting the consolidation of
assets and liabilities of the financial subsidiary on the financial statements of the
bank, limiting the amount of any equity investment in a financial subsidiary to the
amount the bank could payout as a dividend, without the prior approval of the
relevant federal banking regulator, and treating retained earnings of the subsidiary as
an outstanding equity investment of the bank. See H.R. 10, 106th Congo § 122 (b)
(1999).
217 SeeH.R.IO, 106lh Cong. §122 (b)(1999).
218 See S. 900, 106lh Congo (1999) introduced April 28, 1999 by Sen. Gramm.
212
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Committee,219 the bill was passed by the full Senate, prior to passage of H.R.
10 by the House ("1999 Senate BiII").220 The 1999 Senate Bill did not
provide for the establishment of financial holding companies, but instead
utilized the existing bank holding company structure. Bank holding
companies were permitted to participate in a wide array of expanded
activities determined to be financial in nature, as set forth in the bill or as
determined by the Board in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury,
or incidental thereto, including securities and insurance underwriting and
merchant banking.221 The operating subsidiary option was permitted under
the 1999 Senate Bill, but to a far more limited extent than under the 1999
Version ofH.R. 10. A national bank with $1 billion or less in assets that was
not a subsidiary of a bank holding company could engage in new activities
permitted for bank holding companies in the bill, excluding real estate
development and investment,222 through operating subsidiaries. 223 However,
larger national banks were required to conduct such new activities in a
holding company affiliate. 224 National banks and their insured depository
institution affiliates were required to be well-capitalized and well-managed,
and OCC approval was needed. 225 Firewalls comparable to those used in
the 1999 Version ofH.R. 10 were also required. 226
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise on the corporate structure
issue includes some elements found in both the 1999 Senate Bill and the
1999 Version of H.R. 10, but adds new features as a result of negotiations in
the Financial Services Conference Committee ("Conference Committee").
Both the Treasury Department and the Board were actively involved in
working out a compromise in the Conference Committee in order to ensure
its passage by Congress and approval by the executive branch. 227
219 The Senate Banking Committee referred the bill out on March 4, 1999. See
Senate Banking Committee Press Release, Mar. 4, 1999 available in (visited May 7,
1999) <http://www.senate.gov/-bankinglpreI99/0304fsm.htm> .
220 See 1999 Senate Bill, version passed May 6, 1999 available in (visited Oct. 11,
1999) <http://www.house.govlbankinglS900assp.pdf>.
221 See S. 900, 106th Congo §102(a) (1999).
222 SeeS. 900, 106th Cong.§121(a)(1999).
223 See S. 900, 106th Congo §122(a) (1999).
224 See id.
225 See S. 900, 1061h Congo § 121(a) (1999).
226 See S. 900, 106th Congo § 122(a) (1999).
227 House Banking Committee Democrats Press Release, October 12, 1999,
Statement of John 1. Lafalce and Paul S. Sarbanes (criticizing the partisan nature of
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The primary vehicle for new financial activities is a new type of
bank holding company called a "financial holding company," which may be •
established under Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act to engage,
directly or through affiliates, in activities deemed financial in nature,
incidental activities and complementary activities that do not pose substantial
safety or soundness risks for banks or the financial system.228 Activities that •
are financial in nature under the statute include both financial activities that
bank holding companies and their affiliate already engage in, but also new
powers that banks have long sought, including securities and insurance
underwriting, merchant banking, and insurance company portfolio
investment activities. 229 The Board is authorized to make determinations, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, that other activities are
financial in nature or incidental thereto. 23o In order to engage in these
activities, the bank holding company must meet the requirements that each
of its depository institution subsidiaries is well-capitalized, well-managed,
and has received a Community Reinvestment Act rating of satisfactory or
better, subject to an exclusion for newly acquired insured bank
subsidiaries.231 The bank holding company must also file with the Board a
the
Conference
Committee)
(visited
Oct.
26,
1999)
<http://www.house.govlbanking_democrats/pr991012.htm>.
228 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § l03(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(l».
229 See id. (new 12 U.S.C. § I 843(k)(4». The list of activities includes: (1) lending,
exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding money or securities;
(2) insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness,
disability, or death, or providing and issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent,
or broker for purposes of such insurance, in any state; (3) providing financial,
investment, or economic advisory services, including advising an investment
company; (4) issuing or selling instruments representing interests in pools of assets
permissible for a bank to hold directly; (5) underwriting, dealing in, or making a
market in securities; (6) engaging in all activities the Board determined were closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as of November 12, 1999; (7)
engaging in any activity that bank holding companies were permitted to engage in
outside of the United States or that were usual in connection with the transaction of
banking abroad as of November 11, 1999; (8) making portfolio investments in
connection with certain underwriting and merchant banking activities; and (9)
making portfolio investments in the ordinary course of business as an insurance
underwriter.
230 Such determinations may be made by regulation or order. See id. (new 12
U.S.C. § 1843(k)(l), (2».
231 Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 103(a) (new Section 12 U.S.C. § 1843(1»; Section
103(b) (amended Section 12 U.S.C. § 2903).
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declaration of election to be a financial holding company, along with a
certification that the requirements of the statute have been met. 232
National banks are permitted to control or hold an interest in
"financial subsidiaries,"233 which may engage in financial or incidental
activities permitted for financial holding companies pursuant to new Section
4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act, except for insurance underwriting,
merchant banking, insurance company portfolio investments, real estate
development and real estate investment, and activities that national banks are
permitted to engage in directly.234 The Secretary of the Treasury, acting in
consultation with the Board, has the authority to designate additional
activities as financial or incidental to financial activities. 235 Certain
conditions must be satisfied, including the following: (1) the national bank
and each depository institution affiliate must be well-capitalized, well
managed,236 and have received Community Reinvestment Act ratings of
satisfactory in their latest examinations;237 (2) the total assets of all such
financial subsidiaries do not exceed the lesser of 45% of the consolidated
total assets of the parent bank or $50,000,000;238 (3)(a) the national bank
must either be small; or (b) if the national bank is one of the fifty largest
insured banks, its capital structure includes at least one issue of outstanding
unsecured long-term debt rated within the three highest investment grade
rating categories of a nationally recognized rating organization; or (c) if the
232 See Gramm-Leach-BliIey, § 103(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 1843(1».
233 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(a) (new 12 U.S.c. § 5136A(a)(2». National

bank ownership of operating subsidiaries approved by the DCC prior to enactment
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley are grandfathered. See id. (12 U.s.C. § 5 I 36A(e».
234 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(a) (new 12 U.S.c. § 5 I 36A(a)(2)(B». The
Board and the Secretary of the Treasury are authorized to consider dropping the ban
or merchant banking activities five years after date of enactment of Gramm-Leach
Bliley. See id. § 122. It should be noted that national banks themselves are given
certain expanded powers, including the right to underwrite municipal revenue bonds.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 151 (amending 12 U.S.c. § 24 (Seventh». In addition,
insurance activities of national banks were addressed. Insurance activities as
principal were barred with certain exceptions. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, §§ 302(a),
302(b),303.
235 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(a) (new 12 U.s.C. § 5 I 36A(b».
236 See id. (new 12 U.S.c. § 5136A(a)(2)(C».
237 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 103(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 1843(1)(2», § 103(b) (new
12 U.S.C. § 2903(c)(l», § 121 (a)(2) (new 12 U.S.c. § 5 I 36A(a)(7), (g)(5)-(f)(6».
238 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Section 121(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(a)(2)(D);
(a)(3». This requirement is subject to indexing. See id.
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national bank is one of the second fifty largest insured banks, it meets the
capital structure requirement applicable to the fifty largest insured banks or
such other comparable criteria established by the Board of the Secretary of
the Treasury;239 and (4) the national bank has received the approval of the
OCC.240
Safeguards addressing safety and soundness and conflict of interest
problems are put into place. A national bank must deduct the amount of its
outstanding equity investment, including retained earnings in a financial
subsidiary, from its assets and tangible equity, and may not consolidate its
assets and liabilities with those of the financial subsidiary.241 A national
bank with a financial subsidiary must have procedures for identifying and
managing risks within the financial subsidiary and for maintaining the
separate corporate identity and limited liability of the financial subsidiary
that adequately protect the bank.242 The provisions of Sections 23A and 23B
of the Federal Reserve Act are extended to financial subsidiaries. 243 Those
statutory firewalls will continue to apply to financial holding companies and
their affiliates, as they do with respect to other bank holding companies.
While the Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise permits use of an
operating subsidiary by a national bank for new financial activities, national
banks have less flexibility in using such subsidiaries than if a holding
company affiliate were used. This is due to the more limited universe of new
financial activities that may be conducted, the aggregate size limitations for
financial activities conducted through operating subsidiaries, and the capital
structure requirement applicable to large banks. A positive aspect of the
compromise is that use of a bank operating subsidiary to conduct such new
activities has now been put on a firm legal footing, unlike the case with
approvals under the OCC's Operating Subsidiary Rule.

239 See id (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(a)(2)(E». This requirement does not apply in

the case of ownership or control of financial subsidiaries engaged in financial
activities solely as agent and not as principal. See id (new 12 U.S.C. §
5l36A(a)(4».
240 See id (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(l)(F».
241 See id (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(c».
242 See id (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(d».
243 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(b) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 37lc).
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Viewpoints in the Corporate Structure Debate

The corporate structure debate has polarized federal banking
regulators, other financial service industry regulators, and the financial
services industry itself. The Board was the leading advocate for the holding
company affiliate structure. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and various securities
industry and insurance industry lobbyists also favored this structure. The
primary advocate of the operating subsidiary model was the Treasury
Department. The OCC, the FDIC, and the Office of Thrift Supervision
supported this view, along with some leading economists and legal
experts244 and some banking industry lobbyists. This Section will assess the
most important arguments advanced on both sides.
1.

Arguments in Favor of Exclusive Use of Holding
Company Affiliates

The Board has taken the position that new activities should only be
permitted in holding company affiliates and that the use of operating
subsidiaries should not be permitted. Requiring new affiliations to take
place within a holding company structure serves two functions. First, it best
protects the federal deposit insurance funds by limiting the additional risks
permitted to insured depository institutions and therefore serves a safety and
soundness preserving function. Second, it limits the spread of the federal
safety net and its related subsidy and moral hazard problems to entities or

One noteworthy example is the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee
("SFRC"), an independent group of lawyers and economists active in the field of
finance, which frequently comments on emerging problems and policy responses in
the financial service industry. SFRC has consistently taken the position in its policy
statements that there should be no difference in treatment between bank operating
subsidiaries and holding company affiliates. See SFRC Statement No. 153 (Dec.7,
1998) (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http:www.aei.org/shdw> (stating in relevant part as
follows: " ... despite the Fed's arguments to the contrary, there is no prudential
reason to prefer that new nonbanking financial activities be conducted in the
subsidiaries of holding companies rather than the separately capitalized subsidiaries
of banks. Moreover, the Committee has pointed out that the risk of extending the
federal safety net is the same for separately capitalized subsidiaries of banks as for
subsidiaries of holding companies. Accordingly, the Committee does not believe
that either of the Fed's arguments for placing new financial activities solely in the
subsidiaries of holding companies are valid.") See also SFRC Statement No. 118,
136 and 155.
244
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activities beyond the insured depository institutions it was originally
intended to support. 245 This second argument has two corollaries. First, the
public should not be paying for these new activities, but rather they should
be offered at market rates. Second, extending the banking safety net to
non banking financial activities would put non-bank competitors, namely
securities and insurance firms, at a competitive disadvantage. A third
argument is that permitting use of bank operating subsidiaries would cause
banks to cease use of holding company affiliates, which are subject to
regulation by the Board, as vehicles for new financial activities, and to use
such subsidiaries, which are subject to OCC regulation, as an alternative.
This in tum would undercut the Board's role as preeminent bank
regulator. 246

a.

Risk to Bank Safety and Soundness

This prong of the Board's argument has not been well-developed
conceptually either in Congressional testimony on financial modernization
legislation, other public statements by members of the Board of Governors
or in Board publications. In testimony offered at the beginning of the I06th
Congress, this argument was only mentioned in passing and did not number
among the primary arguments advanced by the Board for its position.247 In
earlier Congressional testimony, Chairman Greenspan stated that, while the
new activities being considered were not unusually risky, such activities did

245 See Financial Services Modernization: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Senate

Comm. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, lOSth Congo (1998) (Testimony of
Alan Greenspan, Chainnan, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
[hereinafter Greenspan 1998 testimony]. Greenspan offered substantially identical
testimony on this issue before this and other Congressional committees on numerous
occasions during the IOSth and I06th Congresses.
246 See id
247 See Greenspan 1999 testimony, supra note 19. The arguments in favor of the
holding company affiliate were as follows: I) such structure will inhibit the
widespread employment of federal subsidies over a wide range of activities, which
would place banking organizations at an unfair competitive advantage over
comparable insurance and securities finns operating independently or as bank
holding company subsidiaries, 2) such subsidies would distort capital markets and
the efficient allocation of both financial and real resources that are central to
American prosperity, 3) new fmancial activities by banks should be financed by the
market place and not by the sovereign credit of the U.S., and 4) the extension of the
bank examination model of regulation to new nonbanking financial activities should
be avoided.
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present additional risk and that any losses would have to be absorbed. 248
This thought is not developed further in Greenspan's testimony, but the
logical implication is that because the operating subsidiary is owned by a
national bank, the bank would have to absorb any losses in the subsidiary. If
the bank were rendered insolvent through such a strategy, the federal deposit
insurance funds might be drawn upon because national banks are insured by
the FDIC. Other safety and soundness arguments used by the Board have
been rather vague also, including references to the "greater distance"
between a bank and a holding company affiliate and expressions of doubt
that the corporate separateness doctrine applies to bank operating
subsidiaries in the same way that it applies to affiliates in a bank holding
company structure. 249 In one instance testifying in front of Congress,
Chairman Greenspan went so far as to say that safety and soundness issues
were not raised by use of the operating subsidiary.250
Instead of advancing arguments to show that the holding company
affiliate is a superior structure based on safety and soundness considerations,
the Board's rebutted arguments made by the Department of the Treasury in
support of the safety and soundness of the operating subsidiary structure.
The most prominent examples are: 1) criticizing the Treasury's proposal for
capping potential losses in the operating subsidiary in order to minimize the
exposure of the safety net by requiring the bank to deduct its investment in
its operating subsidiary from its regulatory capital while remaining well
capitalized and by preventing a bank from paying off the debts of its failed
subsidiary,251 2) arguing that, even if statutory barriers were created to limit
See Greenspan 1998 testimony, supra note 245.
See id.
250 See Greenspan 1999 testimony, supra note 19.
251 Chainnan Greenspan objected that such deduction is in conflict with GAAP
248

249

Such proposed deduction also runs counter to the way that banks manage their
subsidiaries, the way regulators have supervised subsidiaries and the way financial
markets are likely to perceive the bank as a whole. Historically, both bank
management and bank supervisors have regarded operating subsidiaries to be an
integral part of the bank and have treated them as departments of the banks whose
operations could have a significant impact on the bank's risk profile. Bank
managers have sought to support their subsidiaries in the past and supervisors have
carefully examined the operations of material subsidiaries in view of the difficulty in
insulating the parent bank from problems in its subsidiaries. In addition, the
financial markets will not view the subsidiary as truly separate and insulated from
the bank. He stated that the requirement that bank dividend payments to a holdip.g
company must be deducted from bank capital, thereby constraining bank
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the impact of subsidiary losses on the parent, there still might be an erosion
of market confidence in the bank's management and health, which would
affect bank stability, which depends on reputation and standing in the
financial markets, 3) dismissing the Treasury's argument that operating
subsidiaries are desirable because they offer operational flexibility to bank
management,252 and 4) ignoring evidence that Edge Act subsidiaries of U.S.
banks have conducted nonbanking financial activities off-shore without
problems. 253

b.

Spread of the Federal Safety Net Subsidy and the
Attendant Mora) Hazard Problem

The federal safety net refers to federal deposit insurance, access to
the discount window, and to the Federal Reserve clearing system. The
subsidy arises as the capital markets perceive banks as a safer risk than
commercial companies, and therefore banks can finance their activities more
cheaply, i.e. they have a lower cost of funds as a direct result of the federal
safety net. The moral hazard problem arises because the safety net may lead
to excessive risk-taking by banks and reduced market discipline. This will
then lead to the need for more bank supervision to counteract the resulting
moral hazard. If the federal subsidy created by the safety net is then
extended to operating subsidiaries engaging in a broader range of activities
than banks themselves are allowed to engage in, the moral hazard problem
would be exacerbated and there would be even a greater need for a
compensating increase in bank supervision. 254
subsidization of holding company affiliate activities, is a more effective constraint
than relying on the deduction from bank regulatory capital for equity investments in
an operating subsidiary engaging in new activities, which is in conflict with GAAP.
See Greenspan 1998 testimony, supra note 245.
252 Chairman Greenspan argued that use of an operating subsidiary will always be
more profitable because of the federal safety net subsidy and therefore, there is no
real choice involved and bank management will always select the operating
subsidiary. See Greenspan 1998 testimony, supra note 245.
253 Chairman Greenspan did not respond directly to this argument. He stated that
the reason to permit Edges to engage in greater securities activities off-shore was to
allow U.S. banks to be competitive abroad. He also stated that considerations of
competitive equity in the U.S. argue against using a universal bank approach in the
U.S. because securities and insurance firms would be placed at a competitive
disadvantage. See Greenspan 1998 testimony, supra note 245.
254 Remarks by Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence H. Meyer at the 1999 F.
Hodge O'Neal Corporate & Securities law Symposium, Washington University
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As stated above, this argument has two corollaries. With respect to
the first corollary, the Board has taken the position that using operating
subsidiaries for new activities would be a "funnel for transferring the
sovereign credit subsidy directly from the bank to finance any new principal
activities authorized by Congress or acc regulatory actions."255 Use ofthe
sovereign credit affects allocation of credit and real resources in our
financial system and issues of risk and degree of supervision are implicated.
Therefore, decisions about use of the sovereign credit should be made by
Congress after full consideration of the implications of such an extension on
the competitive balance and systemic risks of the financial system. With
respect to the second corollary, the Board has made the argument that
operating subsidiaries will operate at a competitive advantage compared to
so-called "independent" firms. Considerations of competitive equity demand
a "level playing field" in the financial services industry and "full, open and
fair competition."256 This seems an odd comment from a banking regulator,
for it goes beyond the traditional concerns of such regulators, such as safety
and soundness. Assuming Greenspan was looking forward to the Board's
new role as "umbrella regulator" of banking conglomerates under Gramm
Leah-Bliley with responsibility for overseeing their financial stability, the
remark becomes more comprehensible. 257

c.

Need to Preserve Board Role as Bank Regulator

This argument has not been well-developed by the Board, although it
has been raised on numerous occasions in front of Congressional committees
holding hearings on financial modernization legislation. The Board has long
maintained that it must maintain its role as a bank regulator, in addition to its
central banking functions. 258 This argument is linked to the previous
argument regarding the spread of the federal safety net subsidy. It is argued
that such subsidy has resulted in lower costs of capital for banks than for
their affiliates and therefore, will lead banks to locate their new activities in
School
of
Law
(Mar.
12,
1999)
(visited
Mar.
13,
1999)
<http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/speeches/currentJI9990312.htm> .
255 See Greenspan 1998 testimony, supra note 245.
256 See id Both the securities and the insurance industries support the holding
company structure as a way to ensure fair competition. See Mark M. Dumler &
Edward E. Sharkey, 70-fear-Old Walls Almost Came Tumbling Down, NATIONAL L.
J., Nov. 2, 1998, at B7.
257 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § III (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)).
258 See Greenspan 1999 Testimony, supra note 19; Greenspan 1998 Testimony,
supra note 245.
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subsidiaries, which are subject to OCC regulation and not Board
regulation. 259

2.

Arguments in Favor of Operating Subsidiary Alternative

Former Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin stated in Congressional
hearings on H.R. 10 that the proposed legislation was extremely significant
because it would become the constitution for the financial system for the
twenty-first century.260 According to Rubin, such legislation must meet five
principles, namely, protect the safety and soundness of the financial system,
provide adequate consumer protection, reduce costs and improve access for
consumers, businesses, and communities, promote innovation and
competitiveness of the financial services industry; and permit financial
services firms to choose the corporate structure that makes the most business
sense. 261 Rubin noted that good financial modernization legislation would
cause the evolution of the industry to occur in a more coherent and orderly
way. However, he also noted that the U.s. financial services industry is
currently strong and competitive abroad and would continue to be so even in
the absence of modernization legislation. Therefore, it was necessary to
"get the solution right." He stated that the Clinton administration had been a
consistent proponent of financial modernization legislation that best serves
the interests of consumers, businesses and communities but opposed, along
with all major organizations of banking institutions, the version of H.R. 10
passed by the House in 1998, because it did not meet this standard. One of
the chief objections of the Administration to the bill as passed by the House
was that it would force banks to conduct new financial activities in bank
holding company affiliates and would prohibit using subsidiaries of banks,
thereby limiting the ability of participants to make their own decisions about
lowering costs, improving services and providing benefits to consumers.262
259 See Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 890 F.2d 1275, 1284 (2d Cir. 1989); Citicorp v. Bd. of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 936 F.2d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 1991).
260 See Financial Services Modernization: Hearings on HR. 10 Before the Senate
Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 105 1h Congo (1998) (testimony of
Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter Rubin 1998 testimony].
261 See Advance Text of the Testimony to be Delivered by Treasury Secretary
Robert E. Rubin to the Senate Banking Committee, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Jun.
17,1998.
262 Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260. The other objections of the
Administration that Rubin mentioned were the following: 1) the bill discriminated
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In addition to the Treasury Department, two of the three federal
banking regulators supported use of the operating subsidiary as an
alternative structure to the bank holding company affiliate. Representatives
of each of these entities testified extensively in front of various
Congressional committees during the lOSth Congress and again in the I06th
Congress.

a.

Use of Operating Subsidiaries for New Activities Would
Strengthen Banks

Rather than causing safety and soundness problems for banks, use of
operating subsidiaries to conduct new activities is a prudent form of risk
diversification that would benefit banks. 263 This would occur for two
reasons. First, banks conducting new activities in operating subsidiaries
would receive additional income in the form of dividends from such
subsidiaries and their financial position would be strengthened as a result. In
comparison, use of a holding company affiliate would lead to income from
the new activities being passed to the holding company, not the bank.
Second, fees and other income from subsidiaries enable banks to offset the
effects of cyclical downturns in other economic sectors, diminishing the
volatility of bank earnings and making the system as a whole less risky.

b.

Use of Operating Subsidiaries for New Activities Would
Strengthen the Federal Deposit Insurance System

Rather than destabilizing the federal deposit insurance system, the
system would be strengthened. This would occur because the additional
against banks and in favor of insurance companies (referring to the provision that
would remove judicial deference to the OCC when considering questions involving
insurance) and this would impede competition and innovation and fail to serve the
interests of consumers; 2) the bill expanded the Federal Home Loan Bank System
without resolving the system's fundamental problems; 3) the bill would cause assets
to be shifted out of national banks and into holding company affiliates, thereby
reducing resources covered by the Community Reinvestment Act, which would
reduce the amount of capital available for urban economic revitalization and
financing for affordable housing and small businesses. See id.
263 See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260, see also Financial Services

Modernization: Hearings on HR. 10 Before the Senate Comm. On Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 105 th Congo (1998) (testimony of Julie Williams, Acting
Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter Williams 1998 testimony].
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earnings from new activities in bank subsidiaries lowers the probability of
bank failure. If a holding company affiliate were used, any earnings from the
new activities would flow through to the holding company, not the affiliated
insured bank. The FDIC has consistently taken the position that, for this
reason alone, allowing banks to conduct new activities in subsidiaries is at
least as safe and sound, and probably more so, than conducting these
activities in holding company affiliates. 264 In addition, the value of the
bank's investment in the subsidiary is fully available to cover the costs of
failure resolution by the FDIC.265 This would not be true necessarily if new
activities were conducted within a holding company affiliate. The ability of a
Federal banking agency to require a holding company to support a troubled
subsidiary is uncertain. 266 The corrective action provisions of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act of 1991 specifically limit the ability of a Federal
banking agency to require a parent bank holding company to contribute
funds to an undercapitalized bank through a capital restoration plan to the
lesser of 5% of the bank's assets or the amount necessary to bring the
The Federal Reserve
institution up to the adequately capitalized level. 267
Board's source of strength doctrine has never been fully litigated and bank
holding companies have sometimes refused to meet regulators' demands to
downstream funds into a troubled bank. 268 The operating subsidiary is a
superior vehicle for this reason also.

264 See Financial Services Modernization: Hearings on HR.

10 Before the
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities and Government-Sponsored Entities of
the House Comm. On Banking and Financial Services, 105 th Congo (1997)
(testimony of Ricki Helfer, Chairman of the FDIC) [hereinafter Helfer 1997
testimony].
265 See Williams 1998 testimony, supra note 263; see also Rubin 1998 testimony,
supra note 260.
266 See Williams 1998 testimony, supra note 263.
267 See 12 U.S.C. § 1831(e)(2)(E) (1999). In addition, a holding company may
decline to supply capital if it is resigned to closure of the bank subsidiary. See 12
U.S.C. §18310(t) (1999). 12 C.F.R. §§6.5(i)(2), 208.44(i)(2), 325.104(h)(2),
565.5(i)(2) (1999).
268 In McCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board ofGovernors, 900 F.2d 852, 857 (5 th Cir. 1990),
rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
called into question the validity on statutory grounds of the source of strength
doctrine.
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Safety and Soundness Safeguards Will Prevent Risks Caused
by Use of an Operating Subsidiary

The new activities that would be permitted under proposed financial
modernization legislation would not be unduly risky.269 However, to the
extent that additional risks would be posed by a bank subsidiary engaging in
new activities, the bank would be insulated from losses associated with such
additional risks by principles of corporate separateness and by adoption of
appropriate safeguards that would mitigate such risks. Therefore, use of an
operating subsidiary would pose no greater risk to bank safety and soundness
than use of a holding company structure. 270
Corporate separateness protects the bank because the subsidiary
would be separately incorporated and maintained and operated as a separate
entity. Under the principle of limited liability in state corporation law in the
U.S., a shareholder is not liable for losses or liabilities of a corporation
beyond the amount of the shareholder's investment. In some cases, however,
courts have pierced the veil of limited liability and held shareholders
responsible for the losses and liabilities of a corporation. As long as the
separate existence of the subsidiary is maintained, this should not occur. It
is no more likely that a court would pierce the limited liability shield of the
operating subsidiary and reach the assets of the bank than it would if a
holding company affiliate is used. In fact, there is empirical evidence that
courts are more likely to pierce the veil in the case of affiliates than they are
in the case of subsidiaries.271
Another device to insulate the bank from losses in an operating
subsidiaries would be through the use of firewalls. The safeguards, which
proposed be included in any new legislation, include
Treasury and the
the following: 1) banks are required to be both well-capitalized and well
managed, subject to sanctions if they are not, 2) all of the bank's equity
investment in the subsidiary must be deducted from the bank's capital and
the bank must remain well-capitalized after the deduction, 3) the bank may
not make an equity investment in a subsidiary that would exceed the amount

acc

269 The FDIC has consistently maintained that the subsidiary structure poses no
threat to safety and soundness. See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260.
270 See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260; see also Williams 1998 testimony,
supra note 263.
271 See Robert Thompson, PierCing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1074 (1991). This study has been cited in prepared
testimony presented to Congress on a number of occasions.
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that it could payout as a dividend, unless it receives regulatory approval, and
4) loans or other credit extensions by a bank to a subsidiary would be
subject to the same limits as bank loans and other credit extensions to an
affiliate pursuant to the prudential restrictions of Sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act and purchases of low quality assets from a
subsidiary would be subject to the limitations under Section 23A applicable
to transactions between banks and holding company affiliates. 272

d.

Permitting Banks to Choose the Corporate Structure for
New Activities Would Benefit Consumers

Banks should have the flexibility to choose their own form of
organization and restricting their choices will have adverse effects on
consumers. There are good business reasons for an institution to prefer a
subsidiary over an affiliate, namely: 1) holding companies are expensive to
form and may be prohibitively expensive for small banks, thereby effectively
preventing them from engaging in newly permitted financial activities, 2)
bank management may wish to retain the earnings flow generated by a new
line of business, 3) bank management may want to diversify earnings of the
bank group, and 4) bank management may simply prefer siting new activities
in subsidiaries, as a matter of corporate culture. 273 Without such flexibility,
banks would be less safe and sound for the reasons discussed in Section
III.B.2.a. above, offer fewer choices to customers, may be under pressure to
charge higher fees on the products or services they are allowed to offer and
may be less able to serve the financial needs of their communities and their
customers. 274

e.

No Net Safety Net Subsidy Exists. Even If Such Subsidy
Existed, Firewalls Could Be Used to Contain The Spread
of that Subsidy to Operating Subsidiaries

This arguments consists of two parts. The first part of the argument
is that there is no net safety net subsidy available to insured banks. This is
because there are very high regulatory costs associated with being an insured
bank that reduce to zero any benefits that might be available because of the

272 See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260; see also Williams 1998 testimony,
supra note 263.
273 See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260.
274 See Williams 1998 testimony, supra note 263.
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existence of the federal safety net. 275 Therefore, there can be no danger of
such a subsidy spreading if operating subsidiaries are used.
The second part of the argument is as follows. Even assuming for
purposes of argument that such a subsidy exists, firewalls might be
constructed that would prevent the spread of such subsidy from an insured
bank to a subsidiary, the same way that firewalls limit this from happening in
the case of holding company affiliates. 276 This was the position taken by the
OCC, which favored adding certain safeguard measures to H.R. 10 that
would impede the flow of subsidized dollars to an operating subsidiary to the
same extent that restrictions impede the flow of subsidized dollars to the
bank holding company and its nonbank affiliates. These safeguards included
extending the quantitative and qualitative restrictions of Sections 23A and
23B of the Federal Reserve Act to loans from a bank to a bank subsidiary,
requiring that a bank deduct from regulatory capital its investment in the
operating subsidiary, requiring the consolidation of the subsidiary's assets
and liabilities with those of the bank, and a prohibition on bank investment
in a subsidiary greater than what it can pay as a dividend to its holding
company without specific regulatory approvaJ.277 If such limitations were
adopted, they would be more effective in preventing the spread of a subsidy
than current law restricting transactions in the holding company structure.
The example offered was the spread of a subsidy from a bank holding
company to an affiliate. This involves a two-step process in which the
subsidy is first transferred from the bank to the holding company in the form
of a dividend payment and then there is a transfer of value from the holding
company to the non-bank affiliate in the form of an equity investment or
other transaction. Under this scenario, there are no legal restrictions to
contain spread of the subsidy except the requirement that the dividend be
permissible for the bank.
f.

New Activities Have Been Conducted Off-Shore through
Operating Subsidiaries in a Safe and Sound Manner

There is empirical evidence that new activities can be conducted
safely and soundly through operating subsidiaries. This is based upon the
use of Edge Act subsidiaries by U.S. banks overseas to conduct securities
activities. These subsidiaries are chartered and regulated by the Federal
275 See infra Section IV.C.
276 See Williams 1998 testimony, supra note 263; see a/so Rubin 1998 testimony,

supra note 260.
277 See Williams 1998 testimony, supra note 263.
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Reserve Board and there is no indication that use of such subsidiaries has
adversely affected the safety and soundness of their parent banks. 278

IV.

POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
DEBATE: THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE FOR NEW
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES

In most industry sectors in the United States, the choice of
organizational form used to conduct activities is a business decision not
subject to governmental regulation. The banking industry is different, some
would even say "special", because of the public role that banks play in the
economy.279 As a consequence, the choice of organizational form used by a
bank for its activities may become very significant, if it can be argued that
such choice will have an impact on an area of legitimate government
concern. On the other hand, if there is no compelling public policy
consideration that must be respected, the choice of organizational form
should be a matter of private choice, as it is in other sectors of the
economy.280
This section will analyze the corporate structure debate from the
perspective of public policy. Four public policy rationales will be discussed
- namely preserving safety and soundness, preventing conflicts of interest,
preventing the spread of the safety net subsidy, and preserving the Board's
ability to handle systemic risk. The purpose of this analysis is to determine
whether there is a compelling government interest that would justify
eliminating use of either the bank operating subsidiary or the bank holding
company affiliate or preferring one form over the other or whether, in the
alternative, banks should be permitted to view the choice as a private
business decision.

A.

Preserving Safety and Soundness

The safety and soundness issue arises out of the concern that certain
new financial activities, like securities underwriting, carry higher levels of
risk than core banking activities and may endanger bank solvency.281 It

278
279

See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260.
See Corrigan, supra note 2.

280 The federal banking regulators have recognized this principle in recent
testimony in front of Congress on financial modernization legislation. See Williams
1998 testimony, supra note 263.
281 See Shull & White, supra note 21, at 465.
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should be noted that this view is not universally held, with some
commentators arguing that permitting banks to diversify into non banking
financial activities would actually decrease the risk of bank insolvency.282
However, the safety and soundness issue will be discussed here because of
the important role it has played in the corporate structure debate. There are
several ways in which the additional risk undertaken by a bank affiliate in
conducting such activities may affect and even endanger the stability of a
bank and, by extension, the financial system. These include liability for
losses incurred by an affiliate, loss of equity investment in the affiliate, loss
of credit extended to an affiliate and loss of public confidence due to failure
of an affiliate. 283 At issue is whether one corporate structure is better than
the other at insulating a bank from losses associated with new financial
activities. Before undertaking a risk analysis of these factors, the available
empirical evidence about the safety and soundness of use of bank affiliates
to conduct new activities will be examined.
1.

Empirical Evidence About Safety and Soundness of
Bank Affiliates for New Activities

This topic was mentioned only on a few occasions in the debate over
financial modernization legislation. There is very little evidence available
because of the legal barriers that have prevented banks from undertaking
nonbanking financial activities except on a limited basis. The historical
experience with using either form to conduct new activities is so limited that
it is difficult to say whether there are safety and soundness problems with
either form or whether one is better than another in containing risk. The best
information might be found in the results of examinations of banks and bank
holding companies, which information is not publicly available. Therefore,
any assessment of this issue must rely on less reliable information that is
publicly available and on information drawn from contexts in which banks
and their affiJiates have been permitted to engage in limited nonbanking
financial activities for some period of time, which include securities
underwriting and dealing by bank holding company affiliates, but not by
national bank operating subsidiaries. However, notwithstanding these

282 See Gary Whalen, Bank Organizational Form and the Risks of Expanded
Activities, OCC ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER 9 7-1 at 7 (1997). Daniel R. Fischel,
Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank
Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301,320 (1987).
283 See Longstreth & Mattei, supra note 21, at 1906-1912; McCoy, supra note 21,
at §§ 8.02 and 8.05.
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shortcomings, there is still some value in looking at the available evidence,
information that was largely ignored in the corporate structure debate.

a.

Holding Company Affiliates

As discussed in Section II.B.I., bank holding companies have been
permitted by the Board since 1987 to engage in securities underwriting and
dealing in bank ineligible securities through Section 20 subsidiaries, subject
to the imposition of firewalls. The Board has stated that, in its experience,
the risks of such securities underwriting and dealing have proven to be
manageable in a holding company framework. 284 The Board liberalized its
rules regarding the operation of Section 20 subsidiaries in 1996 and 1997,
indicating it believed there were no serious safety and soundness issues with
conducting such activities to a limited extent in holding company affiliates.
It is reasonable to infer from this evidence that the holding company affiliate
is a suitable vehicle for the safe and sound conduct of new activities on a
limited basis, subject to regulatory and statutory safeguards.

b.

Bank Operating Subsidiaries

Operating subsidiaries have been permitted for the conduct of
securities activities under U.S. law in two contexts. One is the use of Edge
Act subsidiaries of U.S. banks to conduct securities activities offshore
subject to supervision by the Board.2ss In addition, state-chartered banks are
permitted in some states to conduct securities activities2s6 and the FDIC
takes the position that such activity is safe and sound for state-chartered,
non-member insured banks under its supervision ("bona fide subsidiaries").

i.

Foreign Subsidiaries

To date, there has been only one empirical study published on the
performance or riskiness of these subsidiaries. 2s7 This study examined the

See 62 Fed. Reg. 2622, 2623 (1997).
28S See 12 U.S.C. §§ 611 et. seq. and 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.1 et. seq. (1999).
286 See 12U.S.C. § 1831a(l999).
287 See Gary Whalen, The Securities Activities ofthe Foreign Subsidiaries of u.s.
Banks: Evidence of Risks and Returns, DCC Economics Working Paper 98-2
(1998) [hereinafter Whalen 1998]. Because of the historic limitations on domestic
bank securities activities, the economic studies that have been conducted have
focused on estimating the securities returns and risks that would accrue to banking
organizations entering this line of business, relying on data from independent
securities firms, often on an aggregate industry basis. Because of the methodology
284
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risks and returns associated with U.S. bank involvement in securities
activities overseas for the time period 1987-1996. The type of securities
activities conducted by the banks included securities underwriting, broker
dealer activity, and merchant banking. 288 Overall, the study concluded
banks can lower their risk by engaging in overseas securities activities. 289
With respect to the issue of whether one organizational form is superior to
another, the study noted that there is virtually no empirical evidence
supporting either position because laws and regulations in effect at the time
neither allowed
banks to choose how they organized important
nontraditional activities domestically nor required them to report
unconsolidated financial information on their direct subsidiaries.29o
Comparison of the securities returns and risks of direct and indirect bank
securities subsidiaries with those of holding company affiliates using
industry aggregation revealed some differences in performance. The mean
securities returns of the combined bank subsidiary group were slightly above
those of the holding company affiliates over some time intervals, and their
measured risk was lower in all periods examined. The evidence suggests
that permitting U.S. banking organizations to engage in securities activities
overseas through direct and indirect bank subsidiaries has not had a
significant, deleterious impact on their performance. The author stated that
additional research is necessary to establish the definitiveness of these
findings. However, the study, which is the only empirical study on the
domestic structural issue currently available,291 suggests that the operating
subsidiary should not be eliminated on safety and soundness grounds. It also
suggests that the affiliate structure has not been shown to be better at
containing risk than the operating subsidiary structure.
ii.

FDIC Bona Fide Subsidiaries

The FDIC has permitted bona fide subsidiaries of insured
nonmember banks to engage in securities activities since December 1984.292
used, the relevance of those studies to predicting actual performance is questionable.
See id. at 3.
288 See id. at 7.
289 See id. at 32.
290 See id. at 28.
291 See id. at 32.
292 See 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 (1999). In order to qualify as a bona fide subsidiary.
certain requirements must be met: the subsidiary must be adequately capitalized,
have operations that are physically separate and distinct from the bank operations,
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The types of activities that are permitted include securities underwriting and
broker-dealer activity.293 While the experience of the FDIC with bona fide
securities subsidiaries of insured nonmember banks has been limited, these
subsidiaries generally have not posed safety and soundness concerns. 294
Only one FDIC-supervised institution owns a subsidiary actively engaged in
the fuil range of securities activities permitted by the FDIC, but over 400
insured nonmember banks have subsidiaries engaged in more limited
securities-related activities. These activities include management of the
bank's securities portfolio, investment advisory services, and acting as a
broker-dealer. With one exception, none of these activities has given cause
for a significant safety-and-soundness concern. There has been one failure
of an insured institution supervised by the FDIC that conducted securities
activities through a subsidiary.295 While not the sole cause of the failure, the
business relationship with the securities subsidiary added to the cost of the
failure because the bank had made a substantial unsecured loan that was
used to benefit the securities subsidiary.296
iii.

Inferences from Empirical Evidence

The empirical evidence is not conclusive because it is so limited and,
in the case of operating subsidiaries, the evidence relates to entities other
than national bank operating subsidiaries. However, it carries some
persuasive authority because it indicates that the federal banking regulators,
who are experts on assessing and taking steps to contain risk to avoid safety
and soundness prohlems, have been willing to allow certain securities
activities to be conducted to a limited extent in both holding company
affiliates and operating subsidiaries.
In none of the three examples cited has there been an indication of a
significant safety and soundness problem. Neither the Board nor the FDIC
maintain separate accounting and other corporate records, observe corporate
fonnalities such as separate board of directors meeting, share no common officers or
employees with the bank, compensate its own employees, have a board a majority of
which is composed of persons who are neither directors nor officers of the bank,
conduct business in a way that infonns customers that the subsidiary is separate
from the bank and its products are not FDIC insured bank deposits nor are they
guaranteed by the bank. There are restrictions on loans, extensions of credit and
other transactions between an insured bank and its securities subsidiary.
293 See 12 C.F.R. § 337.4(b) (1999).
294 See Helfer 1997 testimony, supra note 264.
295 See id
296 See id
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has taken steps to limit or discontinue the securities activities in question. In
fact, in recent years, the Board has permitted increased underwriting to occur
in Section 20 subsidiaries, subject to a lower level of firewaHs. It cannot be
concluded from the limited evidence available that the operating subsidiary
form should be eliminated as a vehicle for securities activities. The
empirical study regarding foreign subsidiaries suggests that there is no
reason to prefer the holding company affiliate for securities activities from a
safety and soundness perspective.

2.

Risk Analysis of Safety and Soundness Issues
a.

Liability of Bank or Bank Holding Company for
Losses Incurred by the Affiliate

One way that losses could flow through to the bank would be if the
corporate separateness of the holding company affiliate or operating
subsidiary were disregarded and the bank were held liable for losses in such
affiliate or subsidiary. Piercing the corporate veil is an exception to the rule
of limited liability of shareholders and is widely believed to be more likely in
the case of a parent-subsidiary relationship than in the case of a corporation
with shareholders who are natural persons. 297 Piercing may also occur in a
holding company structure, however, and in fact there is empirical evidence
that courts are more likely to reverse pierce to reach the assets of affiliated
corporations than in the case of a parent-subsidiary relationship.298 It should
be noted that there is only one empirical study on this issue, which has often
been cited in Congressional testimony to support the proposition that
piercing is more likely to occur with respect to holding company affiliates
than it is with respect to bank operating subsidiaries. 299 That study is based
on an analysis of decided cases drawn from an electronic data base involving
a wide variety of corporations and did not study piercing in the specialized
context of banks and bank holding companies. Therefore, it cannot be
regarded as a conclusive study on this issue. What can be said based on the

297 See William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for
Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837, 873 (1982). See Thompson, supra
note 271, at 1056 (arguing that, based on empirical evidence, courts are more likely
to pierce in the case where the shareholder is another corporation than when the
shareholders are individuals).
298 See Thompson, supra note 271, at 1057.
299 See Thompson, supra note 271.
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available evidence and theoretical arguments is that the possibility exists for
piercing in both contexts.
The Board has frequently argued that the holding company affiliate
is a superior structure because it provides a double dose of limited liability,
through the holding company as well as through the affiliate. However,
based on the prior discussion and the possibility of reverse piercing, it
appears that the focus of analysis should be on steps that can be taken in both
contexts to avoid piercing. Studies of instances where the corporate veil of
limited liability has been pierced suggest that there are predictable factors
that a court will look at in making its determination, including whether
corporate separateness between the two entities has been maintained and
whether the subsidiary has been deliberately undercapitalized. 30o Prior to
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, both the OCC and the Board imposed corporate
separateness requirements in connection with regulatory approvals to engage
in underwriting of bank ineligible securities. With respect to national bank
operating subsidiaries, the OCC required that elaborate steps directed at
maintaining corporate separateness set forth in the Operating Subsidiary
Rule be followed in connection with its approvals for such subsidiaries to
engage in revenue bond underwriting.301 With respect to holding company
affiliates, the Board required that Section 20 subsidiaries be operated in a
prudent manner, including maintaining corporate separateness and instituting
The OCC corporate
appropriate risk management procedures. 302
separateness requirements under the Operating Subsidiary Rule were more
explicit than those set forth in the Conditions to Board's Section 20 Orders.
The OCC requirements include the factors that are frequently cited by courts
in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil,303 including adequate
capitalization, maintenance of separate accounting and corporate records,
and observance of corporate formalities. Gramm-Leach-Bliley requires that
national banks owning financial subsidiaries take steps to maintain the

300
301

See Thompson, supra note 271, at 1064-1070.
See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(t)(2) (1999). The FDIC has adopted similar rules

applicable to bona fide securities subsidiaries of insured state nonmember banks,
which attempt to address the same risk.
302 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(a) (1999) ("Conditions to Board's Section 20 Orders")
(referring to maintenance of separate accounting and corporate records; independent
trading and exposure limits consistent with parent company guidelines).
303 See Thompson, supra note 271, at 1064-1070.
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corporate separateness of such subsidiaries and to identify and manage the
financial or operational risks posed by the subsidiary.304
Because corporate separateness requirements can be and have been
put in place for both types of entities, the focus should be on whether these
requirements are adhered to, not on whether a holding company affiliate or
an operating subsidiary is used. If the safeguards are adhered to, it is
arguable that either corporate form should be able to insulate the bank from
any undue risks associated with new financial activities. If, however, such
corporate separateness requirements are not maintained, it is conceivable that
the corporate veil of limited liability will be pierced and losses will flow
through to the bank.

b. Loss of Equity Investment
Another potential risk is the impact on bank safety and soundness if
the holding company affiliate or bank operating subsidiary failed and there
were a loss of an equity investment by the corporate parent. In the case of a
bank operating subsidiary, even a total loss of the investment in the
subsidiary should have no affect on the stability of the bank. This was true
under the OCC's Operating Subsidiary Rule because the bank was required
to deduct its equity investment in an operating subsidiary from its regulatory
capital and remain adequately capitalized after making such deduction.305
Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, national banks must deduct the amount of their
equity investments, including retain earnings, in financial subsidiaries from
their assets and tangible equity and remain well-capitalized. 306 Therefore,
even a total loss of the investment should not have any effect on the bank's
capital ratio.
In the case of a holding company affiliate, a loss of an equity
investment would result in a corresponding reduction in the bank holding
company's capital. The risk would be mitigated, however, if the investment
in the affiliate were required to be taken into consideration in calculating the
holding company's capital position. 307 If the financial position of the bank

Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(d).
305 See supra Section II.B.2. This requirement only applied if the subsidiary
engaged in such activity as a principal.
306 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(a)(new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(c)).
307 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(I) (1999). Investments in a Section 20 subsidiary
were required to be deducted from holding company capital in the 1987 Order, supra
note 83 at 502, and the 1989 Order, supra note 84, at 205. This requirement changed

304 See
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holding company were weakened as a result of the loss, a bank subsidiary of
that holding company would be indirectly weakened because it would be
deprived of the possibility of looking to the holding company as a source of
strength. There are minimum capital requirements applicable to bank
holding companies, which would require that the capital position of the bank
holding company be restored in the event of such a loss.308 However, it is
conceivable that the bank would be deprived of a source of strength for some
period of time until the holding company took steps to improve its capital
position. It should be noted that, although the Board has consistently
maintained that bank holding companies should serve as a source of strength
for their bank subsidiaries, the viability of the source of strength doctrine in
the federal courts is questionable. 309 However, Gramm-Leach-Bliley
contains a provision on the source of strength doctrine, limiting the authority
of the Board and other bank regulators to order regulated insurance or
securities affiliates of a financial holding company, or subsidiaries of a
depository institution owned by a financial holding company, to serve as a
source of strength. This language may provide an implied basis for source
of strength authority because, by limiting it in specific contexts, it assumes
its existence.

c.

Loss of Credit Extended to Affiliate

Another destabilizing event might be the loss of credit extended by a
bank to a holding company affiliate or to an operating subsidiary. Although
the risk of default exists with any credit extension by a bank, it is
exacerbated in this instance because of the possibility of conflict of interest
transactions, which are discussed in Section IV.B. There should not be any
difference in result depending on whether a holding company affiliate or a
bank operating subsidiary is used because the statutory firewalls of Sections
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act are applicable in identical fashion
to the two structures. In the case of a holding company affiliate, extensions
of credit by an affiliated bank are subject to the arms' length,
collateralization, and exposure limitations of Sections 23A and 23B.310 The
OCC's Operating Subsidiary Rule requires application of Sections 23A and
23B to extensions of credit by the national bank to an operating subsidiary
when the frrewalls for Section 20 subsidiary were replaced by the operating
standards in 1997. See supra Section II B.l.c.
308 See 12 C.F.R. part 225, app. A (1999).
309 See McCorp, supra note 268.
310 See 12 U.S.C. § 371c, 371c-l (1999).
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when such subsidiary conducts activities as principaP11 Under Gramm
Leach-Bliley, transactions between a national bank and a financial subsidiary
are subject to the Sections 23A and 23B firewalls. 312
There is also a possibility that a bank could be indirectly weakened
because of defaults on loans made by a holding company to a holding
company affiliate. Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act are
inapplicable if a holding company affiliate seeks funding from its holding
company. Loans could be funded with dividends paid to the holding
company by the bank. 313 As a consequence, the holding company could
transfer resources from the bank to the nonbank affiliate, even in cases
where the bank could not do so directly. In such a case, if the affiliate were
to default on its loan and cause a loss to the holding company, it would
impair such holding company's ability to act as a source of strength for the
bank. 314

d. Loss of Public Confidence Due to Affiliate Failure
A final risk to safety and soundness is loss of reputation of a bank or
bank holding company due to faihue of a holding company affiliate or
operating subsidiary.315 To the extent that new activities in an affiliate lead
to extraordinary losses and the affiliate fails, the public's confidence in
affiliated entities, including insured banks, will likely be affected. Public
confidence in banks is an important component of safety and soundness and
to the extent such confidence is lost, this may be reflected in the stock price
of the bank or holding company, it may result in a downgrade in the debt or
See supra Section II.B.2.
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(b) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 371(c). A financial
subsidiary is considered an affiliate, and not a subsidiary, of the parent bank for
purposes of such provisions. Gramm-Leach-Bliley also includes anti-evasion
language permitting the Board to deem an investment in, or extension of credit by,
an affiliate in a financial subsidiary of a bank to be considered an investment or
extension of credit by the parent bank of the financial subsidiary.
313 National banks must comply with dividend restrictions. See 12 C.F.R. Part 5 (E)
(1999).
314 Prior to revision of the firewalls for Section 20 subsidiaries, holding companies
were required to deduct from consolidated primary capital certain unsecured loans to
such subsidiaries. See 1989 Order, supra note 84, at 205-206.
315 See General Accounting Office, Bank Powers: Insulating Banks from the
Potential Risks of Expanded Activities, GAO/GGD-87-35, at 13 (1987). Keith R.
Fisher, Reweaving the Safety Net: Bank Diversification into Securities and
Insurance Activities, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 123,226 (1991).

311
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equity rating of the bank or holding company, thereby raising its cost of
funds, or it may result in more dramatic action, such as a bank run, which
would undermine bank stability.
There is no reason to assume that this risk would be greater with one
corporate structure than another. The risk can and should be addressed by
taking steps to clarify in the public's mind the separateness of a holding
company affiliate or operating subsidiary from any affiliated banks through
disclosure requirements. 316

B.

Avoiding Conflicts of Interest

Another risk is the possibility that a financially distressed affiliate or
subsidiary will be assisted by its corporate parent to the disadvantage of an
insured bank. In addition to raising safety and soundness concerns discussed
above, there is also the danger that such assistance will result in the
misallocation of credit resources because decisions are not being made on
the basis of objective criteria. This offends the policy principle discussed in
Section I1.A. favoring the impartial allocation of credit. The types of conflict
of interest transactions that might occur include imprudent loans to the
affiliate, making loans at below market rates to the affiliate and sale of low
quality assets from the affiliate to the bank. In the holding company
scenario, it is possible that funds could be drained out of the bank in the form
of excessive dividends payable to a corporate parent in order to subsidize
higher risk activities}17 The incentive for engaging in such transactions is
the problem of moral hazard, namely that the risk of loss is shifted to either
the bank insurance funds or the public and away from private investors.
While the risk of self-dealing exists in all corporate settings, the use
of a holding company magnifies that risk. Because of the complicated
structure, monitoring and detection of misconduct is more costly and
difficult. 318 In the case of financial holding companies, there is a danger that
the risk of such misconduct will be greatest with respect to subsidiaries that
are financial intermediaries, such as banks. This is because such subsidiaries

For an example of the type of disclosure that might be effective, see Retail Sales
Statement, supra note 102.
317 See Shull & White, supra note 21, at 472; McCoy, supra note 21, at § 8.02.
318 See Robert C. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92
HARv. L. REv. 787, 832 (1979).
316
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tend to be larger than other subsidiaries and there is a greater likelihood that
there will be less than complete stock ownership by the corporate parent. 319
The danger of conflict of interest transactions occurring that work to
the detriment of insured banks is increased in a holding company structure
where there is differential ownership of bank and non-bank subsidiaries.3 2o
The danger is that the managers or controlling shareholders of related
entities will bias transactions in favor of subsidiaries in which they hold the
greatest interest in order to maximize the value of their investments.321
There is no requirement of federal law that bank holding companies own all
of the stock of their bank subsidiaries or that they maintain the same
financial interest in bank and nonbank subsidiaries.322 Therefore, it is
possible that a bank in which a holding company or its controlling persons
has a minority interest might be looted in the manner discussed previously in
order to assist a failing nonbank affiliate engaged in securities underwriting.
The same result is possible in the case of a bank operating subsidiary that
operates under a holding company umbrella because the possibility of
differential ownership of the operating subsidiary is not prohibited by federal
law. 323
It has been suggested that there is a greater potential for conflict of
interest transactions in the case of a holding company affiliate than in the
case of an operating subsidiary because, while a holding company may have
incentives to manipulate transactions between and among itself and its
subsidiaries, no such incentive exists with respect to a bank's dealings with
its own operating subsidiaries. It has been argued that the bank's own self
interest will prevent it from engaging in transactions with an operating

319 ld at 833. Clark believed that such conflicts were the greatest danger posed by

•

the financial holding company structure and should be closely regulated.
320 See McCoy, supra note 21, at § 8.02.
321 See Clark, supra note 318, at 829.
322 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(2),(3), and 1843(2) (1999).
323 This result was possible, for example, under the OCC's Part 5 rules governing
operating subsidiaries because such rules provided for the possibility of minority
interests being held by shareholders other than the bank. See 12 C.F.R. §§
5.34(d)(2), (e)(I)(i)(A) (1999). See McCoy, supra note 21, at §§ 8.02 and 8.06(1).
Gramm-Leach-Bliley requires that a financial subsidiary be controlled by one or
more banks, but does not prohibit differential ownership. Gramm-Leach·Bliley, §
121(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(a)(l».
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subsidiary that would have an adverse impact upon it. 324 This argument is
dubious. It does not seem to apply in a case where the bank operating
subsidiary is under a holding company structure because the bank's
management will very likely be controlled by the holding company, which
could exert pressure to engage in conflict of interest transactions. 325 Even in
the case of bank operating subsidiaries outside of a holding company
structure, it is conceivable that bank management would be willing to lower
credit standards with the expectation that the risk of doing so would be
outweighed by the prospect of receiving a steady stream of dividends from a
subsidiary engaged in a more profitable business than the bank itself could
engage in, such as securities underwriting.
The possibility of conflict of interest transactions exists with respect
to both holding company affiliates and operating subsidiaries. Sections 23A
and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act326 address the problem of conflict of
interest transactions entered into by member banks and their subsidiaries
with affiliates. 327 Section 23A limits the type and volume of transactions
that may be entered into. Types of regulated transactions include loans or
extensions of credit to the affiliate, purchases of securities issued by the
affiliate, asset purchases, accepting securities issued by an affiliate as
security for a loan to a third party, and issuing credit supports on behalf of an
affiliate. 328 The volume limitations prevent transactions with individual
affiliates and aggregate affiliate transactions in excess of 10 and 20 percent,
respectively, of a bank's capital and surplus.329 Additional protections
include a ban on most sales of low quality assets to a bank330 and a

'.

324 See Longstreth & Mattei, supra note 21, at 1903-1904 (suggesting that, as a

result, there are greater safety and soundness problems with use of a holding
company affiliate).
325 See Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, 47 HASTINGS
LJ. 287,290 (noting that boards of subsidiaries may approve activities that serve the
interest of the parent).
326 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (1999). These sections originally applied only
to member banks of the Federal Reserve System, but have been extended by
Congress to insured nonmember banks and savings associations in the same manner
they apply to member banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 18280); 12 U.S.C. § 1468 (1999).
327 "Affiliate" is a term of art directed at capturing control relationships involving
member banks where conflicts of interest are most likely to arise. See 12 U.S.C. §
371c(b)(I) (1999).
328 See 12 U.S.C. § 37 1c(b)(7) (1999).
329 See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(I)(1999).
330 See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(3) (1999).
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requirement that extensions of credit to and credit supports issued for the
Section 23B requires that
benefit of affiliates be collateralized. 33 )
transactions with affiliates be on an arm's length basis. 332
Prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Sections 23A and 23B did not apply
to transactions between banks and their operating subsidiaries. 333 However,
the OCC's Operating Subsidiary Rule requires the application of Sections
23A and 23B to transactions between the bank and an operating subsidiary
engaging in activities that are impermissible for the bank. 334 Under Gramm
Leach-Bliley, transactions between a national bank and a financial subsidiary
are subject to the Sections 23A and 23B firewalls. 335
To summarize, many of the most significant conflict of interest
transactions that may arise with respect to banks and their affiliates, both
holding company affiliates and operating subsidiaries, are regulated by the
provisions of Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. In addition,
in connection with approvals of new activities in holding company affiliates
and operating subsidiaries prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, both the Board and
the OCC imposed additional conditions to prevent other conflict of interest
transactions that would damage the affiliated bank from occurring. 336 These

331

332

•

See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(c) (1999).
See 12 U.S.C. § 371c-l(a)(l) (1999).

333 The definition of affiliate in the statute excludes bank subsidiaries, except to the
extent that the Board has determined by regulation or order that such subsidiary
should be considered an affiliate. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(2)(A) (1999). The Board
proposed a rule-making in 1997 which would have applied Sections 23A and 23B to
bank operating subsidiaries that engaged in activities impermissible for the bank
itself, including national bank operating subsidiaries. See Federal Reserve System,
Proposed Rule, Applicability of Sections 23A and 23B ofthe Federal Reserve Act to
Transactions between a Member Bank and Its Subsidiaries, 62 Fed Reg. 37744. The
Board proposed to extend Sections 23A and 23 B out of concern about the potential
for conflict of interest transactions occurring between banks and their subsidiaries.
62 Fed Reg. 37744, 37746. The Board was concerned about the imposition of
firewalls by the various bank regulatory agency on an ad hoc basis and believed that
applying the statutory firewalls would enhance corporate separateness. See id. The
rule has not been adopted as of October 1999 .
334 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f)(3)(ii) (1999).
335 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(b) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 371c).
336 As noted previously, the Board required extensive regulatory frrewalls between
member banks and their affiliates in connection with its approvals of securities
activities in Section 20 subsidiaries. It removed many of these firewalls in 1997
although additional restrictions on conflict of interest transactions not covered in
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regulatory firewalls strengthened the statutory firewalls of Sections 23A and
23B.
Firewalls are not foolproof. It should be noted that there has been no
empirical study done of the effectiveness of firewalls. However, several
commentators have noted that firewalls can be evaded and may give way
under circumstances where they are most needed. 337 Nevertheless, a
comprehensive set of firewalls is the best line of defense against
unacceptable conflict of interest transactions occurring. 338 Gramm-Leach
Bliley does not alter the continued application of the firewalls of Sections
23A and 23B to affiliates of financial holding companies339 and it extends
Gramm
those firewalls to financial subsidiaries of national banks.340
Leach-Bliley also strengthens the Board's authority by providing that it may
impose prudential limitations on transactions between banks and other
affiliates in a financial holding company framework in order to prevent

Sections 23A and 23B remained in place, such as limitations on extensions of credit
to customers to support purchases of securities underwritten by the affiliate and a
requirement that intra-day extensions of credit to the affiliate be on market terms.
See supra Section II.B.1.
In connection with approvals under the Operating
Subsidiary Rule, the OCC required additional safeguards similar to those imposed
by the Board in its revised firewalls for Section 20 subsidiaries. See supra Section
ILB.2.c.
337 The most often quoted remark in this regard was made by Walter Wriston,
former chairman of Citibank, that "it is inconceivable that any major bank would
walk away from any subsidiary of its holding company." Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 97 th Congo (1981)
(testimony of Walter Wriston). Former FDIC Chairman Ricki Helfer has stated that
the firewalls of Sections 23A and 23B "are not impenetrable ... of course in times
of stress fire walls tend to weaken, and transgressions have occurred both within and
outside the reach of the regulators . . . pressure can be exerted from its holding
company as well as from subsidiaries." Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Capital Markets, Securities & Government Sponsored Enterprises of the House
Committee on Banking & Financial Services, 105 th Cong (1997). See Shull &
White, supra note 21, at 459-460.
338 See John R. Walter, Firewalls, 82 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Economic Quarterly 15 (1996) (discussing circumstances under which bank holding
companies have incentives to shift losses to affiliated banks and arguing that
firewalls serve to limit such risk shifting).
339 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 103(a).
340 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(b) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 371c).
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evasions of law, significant risks to a bank, or other adverse effects,
including conflicts of interest. 341
Comparing the holding company affiliate with the operating
subsidiary from the perspective of avoiding conflicts of interest, it does not
appear that either form should be eliminated or that one form is inherently
superior to the other. The possibility of damaging conflict of interest
transactions exists with both structures. An appropriate focus is whether
there are adequate statutory and regulatory firewalls in place that might be
counted on to prevent such transactions from occurring. Even prior to
Gramm-Leach-BliIey, there seemed to be little difference, if any, between
the firewall protections afforded by use of holding company affiliates or
operating subsidiaries.

C.

Preventing the Spread of the Federal Safety Net Subsidy

There are two aspects to this question. One issue is whether the
federal safety net subsidy actually exists. The other issue is whether one
corporate structure is superior to the other in containing the spread of such
subsidy beyond its intended purpose, namely to protect banks and the
stability of the financial system.
With respect to the existence of a subsidy, evidence has been
introduced on both sides of the issue. The Board has advanced evidence that
such subsidy does in fact exist. 342 Other economists have challenged this
conclusion, including an OCC economist whose report has been cited in
Congressional testimony on the issue. 343 The argument made by such
economists is that only a small minority of banks enjoy even a gross subsidy.
This means that, even before factoring in the costs of bank regulation, a
majority of banks pay more for the safety net than it is worth. Recent
legislative and regulatory measures (risk-based capital requirements, prompt
corrective action provisions, risk-related deposit insurance premiums) have
further reduced any gross benefits from the federal safety net.344 These
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 114.
342 See Myron Kwast & Wayne Passmore, The Subsidy Provided by the Federal
Safety Net; Theory and Evidence, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH
(1998). John R. Walter, Can a Safety Net Subsidy Be Contained, 84 FED. RESERVE
BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q. 1 (1998). See also George G. Kaufman, Comments on
The Subsidy Provided by the Federal Safety Net; Theory and Evidence, JOURNAL OF
FINANCIAL SERVICES REsEARCH (1998) (criticizing Kwast & Passmore).
343 See Gary Whalen, The Competitive Implications of Safety Net-Related
Subsidies, OCC Economics Working Paper 97-9 (1997).
344 See id at 4.
341
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economists argue, in addition, that the costs of complying with onerous bank
regulations must be netted against any gross subsidy that in fact exists, with
the end result that the net subsidy enjoyed by most banks is minimal and
may even be negative. 345 It is difficult to draw firm conclusions as to
whether a subsidy exists or not Based on available evidence. 346
Assuming for purposes of argument that a subsidy does exist, the
next issue is whether one structure can better contain the spread of such risk.
One way in which the subsidy could spread would be through infusions of
equity by the bank to its operating subsidiary. This is unlikely to occur with
an operating subsidiary, because under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, as well as
under oee's Operating Subsidiary Rule, a national bank's investment in an
operating subsidiary must be deducted from the bank's capitaJ.347 Because
the bank is required to be adequately capitalized after the investment is
made, there is no greater incentive for the bank to downstream equity to its
operating subsidiary than there is for the bank to upstream payments to a
holding company in the form of dividends,348 which could then be
down streamed by the holding company to a holding company affiliate. In
addition, under the oee's Operating Subsidiary Rule, the bank was subject
to risk diversification requirements limiting a bank's investment in any
subsidiary to ten percent of the bank's capital and surplus. This provision
further limits the ability of a bank to spread a net subsidy to an operating
subsidiary through equity infusions. In contrast, in the case of the holding
company, no comparable legal impediments would prevent a net subsidy
from flowing from a bank through the holding company to a nonbank
affiliate.
Another way that the subsidy could be spread would be through
credit extensions from an insuted bank to an operating subsidiary on terms
more favorable than those that would be offered to a nonaffiliate. This is not
permissible under either Gramm-Leach-Bliley or the oee's Operating
Subsidiary Rule, however, because banks must comply with the arm's length

345 See id at 20.

346 The Financial Services Roundtable has just published a series of papers refuting
the argument that a safety net subsidy exists. See Financial Services Roundtable,
Refuting the Federal Safety Net "Subsidy" Argument (I 999).
347 See Gramm-Leach-BliIey, § 121(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A (c». 12 C.F.R. §
5.34(f)(3)(i) (1999).
348 Such payments would also have to be deducted from the bank's capital.
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requirements of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. 349 In addition the
collateralization and exposure limits of Section 23A are also applicable to
the bank.350 In contrast, a holding company's extension of credit to an
affiliate is outside the scope of Sections 23A and 23B. If such extension of
credit were funded with dividends from an insured bank, any net subsidy
could be transferred to the holding company affiliate through such an
extension of credit. For these reasons, it does not appear that the holding
company affiliate is a better means for containing the risk of spreading the
. federal safety net subsidy to nonbank activities than the operating subsidiary.

D.

Preserving the Federal Reserve Board's Ability to Handle
Systemic Risk

This policy argument has been hinted at in Congressional
testimony,351 but has not been at the center of the corporate structure debate.
There has been no discussion of the issue by commentators on the debate,
although some have suggested that it relates to the "regulatory turf issue",352
which this author has assumed means a power struggle over regulatory
jurisdiction with no important consequences for the public interest. While
that may indeed be the case, it is also conceivable that there is an important
public policy issue lurking here.
Constructing an argument based on the limited available evidence
might go as follows. The Board has consistently maintained that it must be
involved in bank regulation if it is to effectively perform its functions as a
central bank. One of these functions is to serve as lender of last resort for
troubled banks. Because the Board must bail out troubled banks whose
failure may pose risks for the financial system as a whole, it must be allowed
to serve as the regulator for new activities conducted by banks that fall into
that category. Only in this way will it be able to act effectively to minimize
the risk to the U.S. financial system caused by large bank failures arising as a
result of new financial activities.3 53 In the context of the corporate structure

See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(b) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 37Ic). 12 C.F.R. §
5.34(f)(3(U) (1999).
350 See id.
351 See 1999 Greenspan testimony, supra note 19.
352 See Longstreth & Mattei, supra note 21, at 1921.
353 A recent example was the involvement of the Federal Reserve in the Long-Term
Capital Management ("L TCM") case. Members of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve indicated that there actions were motivated by concerns about the
impact on the financial system. See Hearing Before the House Banking and
349

•

420

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

VOL. 19: 329
",

debate, this meant that new financial activities of large banks must be located
in holding company affiliates, which are subject to Board supervision, rather
than in bank operating subsidiaries, which are not. 354 The Board's interest in
bank regulation is different in kind than that of the Comptroller because of
its larger role as a central bank in the context of bank failures. Therefore,
regulation by the Comptroller cannot be deemed to be a substitute for •
regulation by the Board with respect to large banks.
This may have been the motivating factor for the Board's insistence
on use of a holding company affiliate for new financial activities in the
corporate structure debate. Such structure would have addressed the Board's
concern because most banks operating in the U.S. are already part of a
holding company structure.3 ss The only holdouts are small community
banks.3 s6 This means that new financial activities conducted by large banks
would automatically have been subject to Board supervision if the holding
company affiliate were the exclusive vehicle for new financial activities.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise on the corporate structure
issue seems to confirm this belief about the Board's motivations. The
compromise requires that large national banks must have at least one highly
rated outstanding issue of unsecured long-term debt in order to own a
financial subsidiary.357 Small national banks owning financial subsidiaries
are not subject to this requirement. The asset size of a financial subsidiary
owned by any national bank, regardless of size of such bank, is limited, both
Financial Services Committee on Private Sector Refinancing of the Large Hedge
Fund, Long-Term Capital Management (1998) (testimony of Chairman Alan
Greenspan) ("Had the failure of LTCM triggered the seizing up of markets,
substantial damage could have been inflicted on many market participants, including
some not directly involved with the firm, and could have potentially impaired the
economies of many nations, including our own"); Hearing Before the House

Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Banking and
Financial Services Committee (1999) (testimony of Govemor Laurence Meyer).

354 The Board's ability to function as lender of last resort would only be impaired if
a large portion of new financial activities were to be relocated in bank operating
subsidiaries and it has not been established that this would occur. For the Board's
view of this matter, see supra note 23.
355 See Louis Whiteman, Some Banks Find Good Cause to Form Holding
Companies, American Banker, January 9, 1998. The Board estimated that by the
end of 1998, fewer than 20% of banks would operate without a holding company.
356 See id. Banks operating without a holding company controlled only 4% of the
assets held by U.S. banks.
357 The compromise is described supra in Section III.A.
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as a percentage of total assets of the parent bank and in absolute terms. The
requirement that large national banks with financial subsidiaries have at least
one outstanding issue of highly rated secured debt appears to replace earlier
language in the House and Senate bills requiring large national banks with
financial subsidiaries to operate within a holding company structure. This
suggests that the Board accepted the compromise because it believed that the
use of unsecured debt would serve to curb excessive risk-taking by large
banks and their holding companies through exercise of market discipline by
the holders of such debt. While this is not a substitute for Board oversight of
new financial activities of large banks, it serves as a means to mitigate risk.
From the Board's perspective, very little additional risk is introduced into the
financial system as a result of this compromise. The Board would not have
had direct regulatory authority over financial subsidiaries even under the
earlier House and Senate bills, although it would have had authority over the
holding companies of large banks owning such subsidiaries, thereby giving it
early warning of any trouble involving financial subsidiaries owned by such
banks. Even under the compromise, however, it is likely that most large
banks owning financial subsidiaries operate under a holding company,
providing the Board with the same early warning system, regardless of an
explicit requirement in the statute for a holding company structure. Another
risk mitigation factor is asset size limitation on financial subsidiaries, which
serves to contain within manageable parameters the potential impact on the
financial system of failure of a financial subsidiary or its parent bank as a
result of new financial activities. Yet another mitigating factor is the
introduction of bank broker-dealer regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, providing additional oversight of such activities.3 58 Finally,
small national banks are excluded from the unsecured debt requirement,
suggesting that the concern is with larger banks, the failure of whose
financial subsidiaries might have an impact on the financial system. One
could reasonably conclude from this analysis that the Board's position in the
corporate structure debate was driven by its concern about the potential
impact of failures of large banks or their subsidiaries on the stability of the
financial system, i.e. systemic risk.
When one considers the corporate structure debate from this vantage
point, it becomes apparent that there is more at stake than the right of
bankers to have the flexibility to make private business decisions on their
own terms. Indeed, it appears that the corporate structure debate is really
about the ability of regulators to fulfill their legislative mandates effectively.
358 Gramm-Leach-Bliley, §§ 201, 202 (amending 15 U.S.c. § 78c(a)(4), (5)).
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The public policy issue of permitting the Board to effectively function as a
lender of last resort is of crucial significance and should not be ignored in the
corporate structure debate. However, the danger in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
compromise is that it effectively closes the door on the debate, at least for the
time being, without having thoroughly examined the systemic risk factor.

V.

CONCLUSION: THE OPTIMAL CORPORATE STRUCTURE
FOR NEW FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES

Actions taken by federal banking regulators in the years immediately
preceding Gramm-Leach-Bliley changed the landscape of activities
restrictions for national banks and their affiliates. Such regulators, who are
charged with safeguarding the safety and soundness of banks, concluded that
certain activities considered off-limits only twenty years ago, including
underwriting bank ineligible securities, could be conducted in either a
holding company affiliate or an operating subsidiary of a bank. The
regulators did not permit banks to engage in such new activities with
reckless disregard for the increased risks perceived to accompany them, but
rather placed strict limits on the amount and type of such new activities that
could be conducted and required banks to comply with prudential safeguards
directed at preventing the spread of risks that may exist. While such
regulatory activity is not determinative of the issue of whether there is an
optimal corporate structure for the conduct of new activities, it is highly
persuasive. The regulators proceeded cautiously, permitting new activities
only as historical experience with such activities and as the individual
circumstances of each applicant bank have warranted. The logic of their
actions is compelling and the flexible approach they have taken on the
corporate structure issue has merit.
In contrast to the approach taken by the regulators, the Gramm
Leach-Bliley compromise adopts a rigid framework for the corporate
structure banks may use for new financial activities. Under Gramm-Leach
Bliley, the holding company affiliate has emerged as the clear winner in the
corporate structure debate, although use of an operating subsidiary is also
permitted to a more limited extent. While Congressional concern about
containing the risks associated with such deregulation is justified, the choice
that was made, distinguishing between holding company affiliates and
operating subsidiaries and imposing additional regulatory constraints on use
of operating subsidiaries, is not warranted by the available evidence on the
Congress has imposed restrictions on
nature and extent of such risks.
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corporate structure where it has not been satisfactorily demonstrated that
additional risk exists and where no legitimate policy objective may be served
• '" by the distinction that was drawn in the legislation.
This paper set out to answer three questions. First, is there any
reason to eliminate use of either the operating subsidiary or holding
company affiliate as a vehicle for new financial activities based on safety
and soundness considerations or for any other reason? Second, is there any
reason to prefer one structure over another, whether based on safety and
soundness considerations or for any other reason? Third, if there is no
compelling governmental interest in eliminating one structure or preferring
one over the other, should banks be free to choose the corporate structure
they will use for their new lines of business? The author has concluded that
the answer to the first two questions is no, while the answer to the last
question is a qualified yes, subject to further consideration of the unexplored
factor of systemic risk and its relationship to corporate structure in this
context.
There has been a dramatic shift within the past few years in the
terms ofthe corporate structure debate. While the holding company affiliate
was long viewed as the exclusive route for new financial activities, Gramm
Leach-Bliley permits some use of operating subsidiaries. This is definitely
progress, but the compromise is not ideal for it imposes far greater
restrictions on choice of corporate form than many bankers and economists
would like to see. The proposed legislation does have its virtues, however.
Allowing smaller banks to engage in new financial activities through an
operating subsidiary permits new entrants to the market without significant
risks being created for the financial system. Requiring large banks to
conduct such activities in operating subsidiaries subject to additional
regulatory constraints reduces the potential for unmanageable risks to the
financial system as a result of new financial activities. On the other hand, it
is not clear that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise is the most effective
way to deal with the issue of systemic risk in this context. Other alternatives
might have been considered if the issue had been publicly debated. The
compromise has set in stone a distinction between the use of holding
company affiliates and bank operating subsidiaries for conducting new
,
financial activities that may not be necessary from a public policy
perspective. Further study should have been and still should be conducted
on the systemic risk issue in order to clarify what is at stake. Perhaps over
time the additional restrictions imposed on use of operating subsidiaries will
be relaxed, if experience shows that use of financial subsidiaries does not
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create greater risks for the financial system than use of financial holding
companies and their affiliates.
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